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Abstract 
This report starts with a discussion of the types of nuclear vessels accidents, in particular 
accidents which involve the nuclear propulsion systems. Next available information on 61 
reported nuclear ship events is considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships, 54 with USSR 
ships and 1 with a French ship. The ships are in dmost all cases nuclear submarines. Oniy 
events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, 
firedexplosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. For 
each event a summary of avoiilable information is presented, and comments are added. In some 
cases the available information is not credible, and these events are neglected. This reduces the 
number of events to 5 U.S. events, 35 USSR/Russian twents and 1 French event. A 
comparison is made between the reported Soviet accidents and information available on 
duroped and damaged Soviet navai reactors. It seem possible to obtain good correlation 
between the two types of events. An analysis is made ofthe accident and estimates are made of 
the accident probabiiities which are found to be of the order of 
lo3 per ship reactor year 
It is finaily pointed out that the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are fairly local and 
It is emphasized that some of the information on which this report is based, may not be 
does in no way not approach the magnitude of the Chernobyl accident. 
correct. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made rnay not be correct. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Nordic countries there is a considerable interest in 
the nuclear activities at the Kola peninsula. This also includes 
the naval nuclear activities. Norway and Finland have borders 
close to the areas where the nuclear activities take place. In 
case of an accident whereby radioactivity is released to the at- 
mosphere, fall-out may be detected on their territory. The north 
of Sweden is further away, but still situated in the region. 
Denmark will not be directly affected by an accident at the Kola 
peninsula, but Denmark has - like Norway and Iceland - signifi- 
cant fishing interests in the North Atlantic where nuclear 
submarines patrol. In this connection it should be remembered 
that the Faroe Islands and Greenland are part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark. 
For this reason it was decided to include a study of 
accidents with nuclear vessels in th.e 1994-1997 Nordic Nuclear 
Research (NKS) Programme. The present study is a continuation of 
a similar study which was carried out as part of the NKS 
programme of 1990-93. With new information becoming available 
there is a need to up-date the earlier study. 
The report starts with an analysis of possible types of 
accidents which could lead, directly or indirectly, to release of 
radioactivity to the environment. Nex.t a discussion of available 
information of accidents involving nuclear vessels is presented. 
Sea disposal of ship reactors and the status of submarines with 
damaged cores are also considered. Firially a statistical analysis 
of the risk of nuclear ship accidents is attempted, based on the 
information of such accidents. 
At the end of the report a number of annexes containing data 
on Soviet/Russian submarines is given. These data have been 
collected from various sources. They are not always consistent 
and may also not be correct, so they should be used with caution. 
2. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Most of the accidents considered in this report involve 
naval vessels and therefore sensitfive information related to 
national security . Nevertheless , during the recent years an 
increasing amount of information has become available on the 
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topic considered in this report. l’here exists a considerable 
number of books, articles and reports in addition to naval 
handbooks which contain information cm naval nuclear ships and on 
accidents which have occured with these ships. However, the 
information contained in these publications is not always - 
reliable. This is hardly surprising since naval authorities do 
not - for obvious reasons - wish to reveal design information on 
the strengthsiweaknesses of their nuclear ships to potential 
adversaries. 
The - understandable - lack of information may sometimes be 
used to mislead the public. The official authorities involvedmay 
use it to dowplay the seriousness of accidents while anti-nuclear 
or anti-military groups may use it tc exaggerate the seriousness. 
Also much of information available in this field has passed 
through people who do not have the necessaryprofessional insight 
in the field of nuclear safety. They may therefore have misunder- 
stood or misinterpreted the informaCion that they pass on. 
These factors, combined with the often limited information 
available, make it difficult to get a objective and correct 
assessment of the accidents. When reading this report it should 
therefore be kept in mind that the information given and the 
assessments made may not be correct. However as more information 
gradually becomes available, better understanding of the 
accidents and of their impact on nuclear safety is obtained. 
Ful1 information on the accidents which have involved l o s s -  
of-coolant accidents or criticaiity accidents could be of great 
value for nuclear safety research in general. 
Even though the interest of the Nordic countries involves 
primarily the nuclear activities on the Kola peninsula, relevant 
nuclear vessel accidents which have occured elsewhere are also 
included because they are of equal importance for the improvement 
of our understanding of nuclear safety. 
All available sources have beeri used in the preparation of 
this report whether they originate from official institutions, 
from environmental groups or any other sources. However, wherever 
possible an attempt has been made to evaluate the information and 
to discard what is not believed to be correct. A list of the most 
important references are found in section 9 of this report. 
3. TYPE OF ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 
It is unavoidable that nuclear ships becomes involved in 
incidents and accidents in the same way as ordinary ships. This 
is in particular so because almost a:Ll nuclear ships are naval 
vessels. Such vessels are designed for use and used - and the 
crews are trained accordingly - under circumstances where 
ordinary safety measures can not always be taken. However, in 
order to compensate for this, nuclear naval ships are likely to 
be designed with such safety features that even if accidents 
occur, the consequences should be limited. 
The most common cases of nuclear ship incidents/accidents 
are collisions, problems with the nuclear power plant, groun- 
dings, fires and explosions as well 2s development of leaks in 
the sea-water systems of submarines. 
It is of interest to note that collisions and groundings 
seldom lead to serious accidents. The reason is undoubtedly that 
naval ships are designed to function under very difficult 
circumstances, i.e. under enemy attack with exploding bombs, 
granates and depth charges. To survive under these circumstances 
the ship designs have to be very robust, and such designs also 
make the ships resistant to collision and grounding damage. As 
far as is known collisions and groundings have never lead to 
serious accidents in spite of the fact that they have occured in 
considerable number. Therefore these types of accidents will be 
neglected in the following. 
In the present report assessments have been made of 
available information on nuclear ship accidents which (a) 
involved the nuclear propulsion plant, directly or indirectly, 
(b) serious radiation accidents, (c) fires/explosions, (d) leaks 
in the the sea-water systems or (e) the sinking of the vessel. 
Accidents in habours or at shipyards are in general not included 
since here the reactor(s) has in most cases not been operating 
for some time and since countermeasures can more easily be 
applied here. 
Regarding accidents involving th.e nuclear propulsion plant 
the following are of particular intezest: 
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3.1. Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA) 
As far as is known, no western nuclear vessel has suffered 
a LOCA, but the Soviet nuclear navy has had some case of this 
type of accident. LOCA’s are most likely to occur when a reactor 
is operating at full power, but they may also happen when the 
reactor is shut down. Since almost all ship reactors are 
pressurized water reactors, the following discussion is limited 
to this reactor type. 
When a reactor is running at f u l l  power and the cooling of 
the core is for some reason stopped or significantly reduced, 
e.g. because of a major leak in the primary circuit or because of 
l o s s  of the power supply to the main circulation pumps, boiling 
will start in the core. The stean; formation will reduce the 
amount of water (moderator) in the core, and this will stop the 
chain reaction. The loss of coolirig should also activate the 
Control rod system, and the Control rods will move into the core, 
thereby shutting the reactor down permanently. 
However, even though the chaiii reaction is stopped there 
will still heat production in the fuel elements due to the decay 
heat of the radioactive materials in. the fuel, in particular the 
fission products. Immediately after shut-down the power level 
will be 6-7% of the power level before shut-down. 24 hours later 
the power level will still be at about 0.5% of full power. 
This decay heat will initially be removed by boiling of the 
coolant. However, the coolant will gradually disappear, either 
due to leakage or due to evaporation, and the water level in the 
reactor tank will decrease. If the supply of coolant to the core 
is not rapidly restored, the water level will fa11 below the top 
of the fuel elements. The upper parts of the elements will heat, 
up and fuel may reach its melting point. The fuel elements or 
part of them may undergo a melt-down whereby the reactor is 
destroyed and radioactive matter released to the surroundings. 
Examples of such accidents are given in section 4: July 1961. 
Soviet Hotel Class Submarine (K19) Accident; May 1968. Soviet 
Nuclear Submarine ( K 2 7 )  Accident; July 1979. Soviet Echo-I Class 
Submarine (K116) Accident. 
The decay heat will gradually decrease, and so will the 
risk of a LOCA. However, some time after shut down the fuel may 
still reach the melting point and melt, if cooling is lost. Such 
a type of LOCA whereby some of the fuel was so deformed that it 
could not be unloaded from the core has been reported for the 
icebreaker Lenin (see: Autumn 1966. Icebreaker NS Lenin Acci- 
dent) . 
According to western media an incident which could have 
resulted in a LOCA, occured at a naval base near Murmansk. The 
local power company decided to cut the electricity supply to the 
base since the navy had not payed its electricity bill. At the 
base a nuclear submarine was docked which had returned recently 
from a patrol and therefore needed electricity supply for its 
cooling system. This supply came from land. Since the cut of 
electricity could have resulted in a LOCA, soldiers from the base 
forced at gun point the Utility staff to re-establish the power 
SUPPlY * 
After a cooling time of a couFle of years the decay heat 
can be expected to be so low that even if all cooling is lost, 
radiation heat transfer should be sufficient to avoid fuel 
melting. This means that most of the Russian, decommissioned 
submarines which have not as yet been refueled due to lack of 
storage facilities of for spent fuel would probably not suffer a 
LOCA, even if they lost all water in the primary circuit. 
It should be mentioned that the release of radioactive 
matter to the surroundings in connection with LOCA’s may well - 
depending on the circumstances - be fairly limited. In 1989 a 
Soviet Echo-II class submarine suffered a loss-of coolant 
accident near the Bear Island in the North Atlantic Ocean. In 
spite of the fact that the Norwegj-an authorities took water 
samples in the area shortly after the accident, little radioac- 
tivity was detected (see: June 1989. Soviet Echo-II Class (K192) 
Submarine Accident) . 
Loss of coolant accidents may also occur in spent fuel 
storage facilities, if the fuel is stored under water, and if the 
water for some reason drains out of the pool. However, unless the 
fuel has recently been in an operating reactor, such an accidents 
may perhaps more correctly be called a loss-of-shielding 
accident, because the risk involved is more likely to be the lack 
of water shielding rather than to be lack of water cooling. 
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Problems with fuel storage facilities at Kola has been reported, 
but it seems that they have not involve LOCA’s. 
3.2. Criticality Accidents 
Criticality accidents may occur under variuos circumstan- 
ces. However all such accidents involve an increase of the 
effective multiplication factor of a configuration of fissile 
material (fuel) to a point where the configuration becomes 
supercritical or even prompt supercritical. In such cases the 
power will rise with time constants which are in the millisecond 
range, and the destruction of the fuel configuration is usually 
unavoidable. 
The western nuclear navies do not seem to have had 
criticality accidents, but the S L - 1  reactor of the US Army 
suffered such an accident. The Soviet Navy have had some 
criticality accidents. It is of interest to note that criticality 
accidents have never occured during reactor operation, but always 
when the reactors have been shut down, e.g. in connection with 
refueling, changes in or installations of the Control system or 
tests of the reactor system. Soviet: criticality accidents are: 
Feb. 1965 Soviet November Class Submarine (K11) Accident; Aug. 
1968. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine (K140) Accident; 1970. Soviet 
Charlie-II Class Submarine (K320) Accient; Nov. 1980. Soviet 
Nuclear Submarine (K222) Accident; Aug. 1985. Soviet Echo-II 
Submarine ( K 4 3 1 )  Accident. 
Traditionally the excess reactivity of a reactor should 
have its maximumvalue immediately after refueling. With the long 
lifetime of submarine fuel and the extensive use of burnable 
poison in the fuel or in special absorber rods this may not be 
the case for modern submarines. Further, even if the excess 
reactivity of a submarine reactor just before refueling is at its 
minimum, it will still in cold condition and some time after the 
last ful1 power operation have reactivity enough to go prompt 
critical, if all Control rods are removed from the core. This is 
due to the negative temperature coefficient of naval reactors 
(PWR’s) and due to the need to override the xenon poisoning 
during operation. This means that the criticality accidents may 
also occur during the last defueling of old submarines, if the 
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defueling is not performed in a proper way. It should be added 
that while the excess reactivity of an old core may be at a 
minimum just before refueling, the coritent of fission products in 
the core will be at a maximum. Thus t:he potential radioactivity 
pollution with an old core is likely to be more severe than with 
a new core where the radioactivity content is limited to the 
fission products produced during the power excursion. 
5 submarines, 2 American and 3 Soviet, rest at the bottom 
of the sea due to accidents during operation (see: April 1 9 6 3 .  US 
SSN Thresher Accident; May 1 9 6 8 .  US SSN Scorpion Accident; Apr. 
1 9 7 0 .  Soviet November Class Submarine ( K 8 )  Accident; Oct. 1 9 8 6 .  
Soviet Yankee-I Class Submarine (K219)  Accident; Apr. 1 9 8 9 .  
Soviet Mike Class Submarine (K278)  Accident). In all of these 
cases the accidents were not due to tkie reactor system, and there 
are good reasons to believe, that the reactors were shut down 
before the submarines sank. Howevzr, in the long run the 
corrosion of the sea water will affect; the core materials. Should 
the Control rod materials corrode more rapidly that the fuel 
materials, the reactor may at some stage go critical. If the 
increase of the reactivity with time is slow - which is likely to 
be the case - the consequences should be limited. The reactor 
will heat up and run at some low power level, thanks to its 
negative temperature coef f icient . 'However, if the corrosion 
results in some sudden, major changes of the core configuration, 
e.g. the Control rods suddenly dropping out of the reactor, the 
event may result in a power excursion. 
The USSR has deposited 7 reactors containing spent fuel in 
the Kara Sea east of Novaya Zemlya. These reactors was not 
defueled because reactor accidents had made the removal very 
difficult. It is unlikely - although it can not with the 
available knowledge be totally excluded - that corrosion at some 
time in the future could make the reactors critical. Melting of 
fuel will usually make reactors more compact, and since submarine 
reactors are undermoderated, fuel mel-ting is likely to make them 
even more undermoderated and thereby reduce the reactivity. 
A special case is the Soviet K;!7 submarine (see: May 1968. 
Soviet Nuclear Submarine ( K 2 7 )  Accident). It has a November class 
hull, but is provided with two intermediate-energy-neutron reac- 
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tors, cooled by a lead-bismuth alloy. The submarine suffered a 
LOCA accident in 1968 and was sunk with fuel in both reactors in 
1981 near Novaya Zemlya. Since the reactors run on intermediate 
energy neutrons any in-leakage of water which is likely to happen 
some time in the future, is likely to improve moderation and to 
increase the reactivity. This cou:ld make the reactor super- 
critical. The problem was considered. by Soviets experts prior to 
the dumping, and it was decided that such an accident was 
unlikely. 
Finally criticality accidents could also occur in spent 
fuel storage facilities. These facilities usually use a so-called 
safe geometry storage. This means that even if the whole facility 
is filled with fuel, criticality will not occur. However, 
accidents may lead to unsafe geometries. Also in the present 
situation where all spent fuel storage facilities of the Russian 
Navy are filled up, it might be tempting to increase the number 
of spent fuel elements in the facilities. If this is not done 
properly, it could lead to criticality accidents. 
4. NUCLEAR SHIP ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 
There exist no agreed definition of nuclear ship accidents. 
In this report it will be defined, as mentioned above, as all 
events that are claimed to have involved the sinking of nuclear 
ships, leaks in sea-water systems, fires or explosions, damage to 
the nuclear propulsion plant, and/or serious radiation exposures. 
The list is not necessarily complete. Since today more infor- 
mation is available on Soviet/Russian than on Western submarine 
accidents it might well be that more western than Russian 
accidents are missing. 
According to the information available the following 
accidents and incidents have occurecl: 
1954. US Navy Reactor Accident? 
According to Russian sources the US Navy had a reactor 
accident in 1954, whereby 4 persons were killed. 
Comments: Such an accident :-s not known from western 
sources. It could be a mix-up with the reactor accident of the 
SL-1 reactor of the US Army at the National Reactor Testing 
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Station in Idaho where 3 persons were killed during refueling. 
However, this accident occured in 1961 and did not involve a 
submarine reactor. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Sep. 1960. Soviet November Class Submarine (K8) Accident 
According to Russian information the third November class 
nuclear submarine K8 which belonged to the Northern Fleet 
suffered an steam generator accident cn October 13th, 1960, while 
participating in an naval exercise in the Barent Sea. It is not 
clear what actually happened, but it seems to have involved a 
major leak in the steam generator and also a leak of helium from 
the pressurizer (compensator) system, either a direct leak or 
through the steam generator. The valves for blocking off the 
leaks did not work. According to one source they were also 
damaged. Helium and steam appeared in the turbine compartment. 
The reactor was immediately shut down and arrangements made to 
ensure the cooling of the core. According to one source this was 
done by installing a provisional emergency water supply system. 
The accident gave rise to leakage of radioactive gases which 
spread to all compartments, but the contamination was in 
particular high in the last compartment. The personnel had to be 
evacuated from this compartment . The submarine sailed back to 
base by its own means. 
The submarine was decontaminated at the base. 13 crew 
members were exposed to 1 8 0 - 2 0 0  (rem?: or higher doses. They were 
taken to a special medical center in Polyarny. One person died 
two years later. 
According to western sources the same submarine, K8, 
suffered what seems to be a similar accident (a generator ex- 
plosion) on September 9th or 13th, 1961. The accident resulted in 
the hospitalization of 13 members of the crew. Presumably it is 
the same accident. This is in agreemerit with Russian information. 
Comments: The accident seems to have been caused by a major 
leak in one of the steam generators. Thus it involved the nuclear 
propulsion plant. 
The major leak in one of the steam generators would cause a 
pressure drop in the primary circuit. which again would lead to 
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boiling in this circuit, including the core. The higher pressure 
of the primary circuit would cause a flow of steam/water from the 
primary circuit to the secondary through the defect steam 
generator. The pressurizer of the submarine presumably uses 
helium gas to regulate the pressure of the primary system. Else 
it is difficult to understand where the helium came from. If the 
pressure is regulated automatically, the reduction of the 
pressure of the primary circuit would activate the pressure 
Control system which would send helium into the pressurizer. Once 
the helium has pressured all water out of the pressurizer, helium 
could move through the primary circuit and the damaged steam 
generator to the secondary circuit and from there to the turbine 
compartment. This is of course all speculations. 
Russian sources do not mention anything about damage of the 
fuel due to overheating. However the high radiation doses and the 
decontamination of the last comparzment seem to indicate that 
some of the fuel leaked. There is no indication that the damage 
of the fuel was so severe that the fuel could not be removed from 
the core by standard procedures. 
July 1961. Soviet Hotel Class Submarine (K19) Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports a Soviet Hotel 
class submarine, carrying ballistic missiles, suffered a serious 
leakage in a coolant pipe of the nuclear power plant when the 
submarine was near the coast of the UK. The boat was returning 
from a training exercise. The leakage caused serious con- 
tamination of parts of the ship and radiation exposure of crew 
members. The radiation level was reported to be 5 R/hr in the 
area where the pipe broke. The submarine managed to reach its 
home base where it had to be ventilated for 2 month. 
This report was confirmed in 1990 and later supplemented 
with information from several Russian sources. 
The accident occurred in the first Soviet ballistic missile 
submarine, K19, of the Hotel class 011 July 4th 1961. K19 belonged 
to the Northern Fleet and was provided with 3 nuclear armed, 
ballistic missiles. The submarine was sailing submerged in the 
North-Western Atlantic where it was participating in a naval 
exercise together with Soviet diesel submarines several thousands 
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kilometers from its home base. The Soviet ships were pursuing a 
fleeing enemy. When it was first repor-ted around 4 o'clock in the 
morning that the pressure was dropping in the pressurizer, the 
Captain did not react, so the submarine continued the pursuit at 
ful1 speed. It should have been clear to the Captain at that time 
that a leak had developed in the primary system in one of the two 
reactors of the submarine. The leak was due to a crack in a pipe 
which was part of the pressurizer system. 
It has been reported that the probable reason for the 
formation of the crack was an incident during the start-up tests 
of one of the submarines two reactors. When the first pressure 
test was performed the pressure went up to around 400 atm. 
because the pressure gauges did not wc)rk. The design pressure was 
200 atm. The high pressure caused non-elastic deformations of the 
piping of the primary system and probably damage to welded and 
soldered joints. The Captain of the submarine who was in charge 
of the test, did not report the incident to his superiors so that 
the required repair work was not performed. 
Shortly after the first leakage report the automatic alarm 
system was activate. During reactor operation the temperature of 
the cooling water was around 300 "C. The reactor pressure, 
maintained by use of a high-pressure gas system, was two hundred 
atmospheres. The leak caused a rapid decrease in the reactor 
pressure which approached atmospheric pressure. The reactor water 
started to boil, and the cooling of the core became insufficient. 
The Control system worked correctly and shut down the reactor 
automatically. The temperature in the reactor room reached at 
least 140 "C, the upper limit of the thermometer. 
At this point a fire was ignited (the reason for the fire 
was not given) in the reactor room of the disabled reactor, but 
it was extinguished. The submarine siirfaced, for the first time 
after several weeks of submersion. 
Radioactivity started to spread in the submarine due to the 
leak and to the fire fighting. The dose rate in the Control room 
of the submarine was (upto?) 50 R/h:r, and it was very high in 
some areas of the reactor room. All compartments of the submarine 
were hermetically sealed, but it was impossible to stop all 
traffic between the compartments due to the development of the 
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event s .  
The major problem was the cool.ing of the core. Before the 
accident the reactor had been operating at ful1 power, and 
without continued cooling the fuel elements would overheat due to 
the decay heat. According to some sources the reactor had not 
been provided with an emergency core cooling system because this 
would have delayed the completion of the submarine, and because 
it was felt important to get experience with this new type of 
nuclear submarine. According to snot-her source an emergency core 
cooling system was installed, but did not function. The tempera- 
ture of the fuel increased continuously and reached 800 " C .  Hence 
there was a risk of a core melt-down. This could result in a very 
serious situation. 
In order to avoid this situation an improvised emergency 
core cooling system had to be manufactured and installed within 
a few hours with the means available on board. It was done by use 
of the drinking water supply. Other systems of the submarine, in 
particular the weapons systems, had to be cannibalized to provide 
the needed piping. The welding of the new cooling system had to 
be performed in the reactor room. The work was carried out by 3 -  
man-teams who worked in 5-10 minute periods, only protected by 
gas masks and raincoats. However, the working period of the gas 
masks was only 40 min, and they were soon out of use. The staff 
who carried out this task was specialists, and they fully under- 
stood the risks involved in this operation. 
The new cooling system proved to be effective. The continued 
increase of the fuel element temperature, the melting of the fuel 
( ? )  and a possible steam explosion in the core were avoided, but 
at a high cost of human lifes. Accortling to a Russian source 7 of 
the persons involved died of radiation sickness within 7 to 10 
days in a hospital in MOSCOW, a lieutenant and 6 sailors. It has 
been estimated that the dose received by these crew members was 
about 3 times the lethal dose. Another source claims that the 
doses were 50 to 60 Sievert (5000 to 6000 rem). Three month later 
a Captain lieutenant died. 
According to a western source 3 additional crew members 
received radiation doses much 1arge:r than the permissible dose. 
According to another western sourcc? 22 crew members were dead 
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within 2 years after the accident and according to a third, 
western source the total number of crew members killed was 30. 
The total size of the crew was 139. 
Almost no radioactivity escaped to the environment during 
the accident. 
The submarine sailed towards itr; base by use of the other 
reactor. Several of the compartments were contaminated with 
radioactivity, and the submarine could not communicate with its 
base since its arials had been damaged during a cruise under the 
polar ice. Finally K19 met two Soviet diesel submarines. One 
source states that the crew except a smal1 number was evacuated 
to the diesel submarine and that K19 was towed back to its base 
at the Kola peninsula. Another source reports that only the 
highly exposed crew members were transfered to the dieselvessels 
due to the storm and that towing was not possible. When the storm 
faded away, K19 was towed to its base by a salvage ship. 
The submarine was later repaired and brought back into 
service. This was done by cutting the reactor compartment out of 
the submarine and replacing it with a new nuclear power unit. The 
old compartment of K-19 was dumped in the Abrosimov Gulf on the 
eastern side of Novaya Zemlya in 1965 with the fuel remaining in 
both reactors. 
Comments: In this case it is seen that the raw western 
intelligence reports agree well with the later, more complete 
Russian information, and that the accident was in fact more 
serious than implied in the initial western reports. 
The high radiation level in the Control room seems to 
indicate that the only containment of the two reactors was the 
hul1 and the bulkheads at both ends of the reactor compartment 
and that the bulkhead doors had to be open due to the fire 
fighting and the repair work. Thus the spread of radioactivity 
from the reactor room to neighboiiring rooms could not be 
prevented. 
If the reactor fuel had remairied undamaged, the reactor 
water would have lost most of its radioactivity within a few 
minutes after reactor shut-down. Thus the high radiation level in 
the reactor and the Control room indicate that the fuel w a s  
damaged and fission products released before the new cooling 
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system came into operation. This agrees with the fact that the 
fuel was not removed from the reactor compartment before dumping. 
According to available information the reactor compartment 
was dumped with fuel in both reactors, even though only one 
reactor was involved in the accident. If this is correct, the 
reason could be that the reactor conipartment was so contaminated 
that it was very difficult to defuel the undamaged reactor. 
1962. US SSN Skate Incident 
In 1962 the US attack submarine SSN Skate suffered a leak in 
a seawater circulation system according to media sources. The 
leak developed while the submarine was submerged at 400 ft on its 
way through the Baffin Bay off Thule, Greenland. The incoming 
sea-water started to flood the engine room. The submarine did not 
loose power and surfaced safely. At che surface where the outside 
pressure of the sea-water is greatly reduced, the flooding was 
stopped. 
Comments: It seems reasonable to classify the event, if 
real, as an incident since the submarine and the crew suffered no 
damage. But it demonstrates the risk involved in leaks from the 
outside ocean into the boat to which deep diving submarines are 
always exposed. The nuclear propulsion plant was not involved in 
the incident. 
Apr. 1963. US SSN Thresher Accident 
The US submarine SSN Thresher departed from Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard on April 9, 1963, to conduct sea trials following a 9 
months overhaul period. There were 129 persons on board. Of these 
106 were the crew, and the remaining were employees of the 
shipyard and US Navy representatives. At 7.47 AM on April 10, 
1969, Thresher had a rendezvous with its escort ship. A few 
minutes later Thresher started a deep dive, reporting its course 
and depth changes to the escort vessel. It appeared that the dive 
was progressing satisfactorily. However, at 9.13 AM Thresher 
reported: "Experiencing minor diff i-culties. Have positive up 
angle. Are attempting to blow. Will keep you informed". Listeners 
at the escort vessel heard next sound of compressed air rushing 
into the submarine's balast tanks, as Thresher tried to surface. 
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3 minutes later a garbled transmission was received which is 
believed to have contained the words; I I .  . .test depth" . That was 
the last contact with Thresher. Subsequent investigations of the 
US Navy concluded that a flooding casiialty in the engine room is 
the most likely cause for the sinking of the submarine and that 
it is most likely that a piping systerri failure had occured in one 
of Threshers salt water systems, probsbly in the engine room. In 
all probability the incoming water affected the electrical 
circuits and caused a l o s s  of power. Thresher sank 350 miles east 
of Boston and 1 6 0  km east of Cape Cocl at a depth of around 2600 
m (41"43'N, 6 4 " 5 7 ' ) .  It was crusheti by the pressure of the 
surrounding water and split in 6 major sections which now rests 
on the ocean floor. The major sections are the sail, the sonar 
dome, the bow section, the engineering spaces section, the 
operation spaces section, and the tail section. The majority of 
the debris were scattered over an area of about 400  m square. A l l  
1 2 9  men on board, including 17 civilians, were killed. The wreck 
of the submarine was located and photographs of debris were taken 
at the sea bottom. N o  attempt was made to recover the remainings 
of the submarine. 
Radiological monitoring of the area was carried out in 1 9 6 5 ,  
1977, 1 9 8 3  and 1 9 8 6 .  None of the samples taken contained fission 
products and uranium above the natural background. Very low 
concentrations of 6oCo, originating from corrosion of activated 
components of the primary circuit, were detected in the sediment; 
the maximum concentration found was 0 . 3 2  pCi/g, a factor of about 
100 lower than the n a t u r a l  radioactivity of the sediment. No ''CO 
was found in fish and other marine life specims collected in the 
area. 
Comments: As mentioned above the cause of the accident does 
not seem to have anything to do with with the nuclear power plant 
of the submarine. But the flooding of the hul1 did of course lead 
to the failure of the plant. 
1964. Soviet Nuclear Submarine (K27) Incident 
According to western sources the first Soviet submarine with 
two liquid metal cooled reactors, K 2 7 ,  suffered an cooling 
incident during its maiden voyage in 1 9 6 4 .  The submarine was a 
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modified November class boat. The incident involved a freeze of 
the coolant in one(?) of its reac1;ors. The coolant was later 
remelted and operation continued. 
Comments: Since the submarine continued operating, though 
with difficulties until 1968 (see Ma.y 1968) , the incident was not 
very serious. 
Mid 1960s. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accidents 
According to western sources a first generation nuclear 
submarine (Hotel, Echo or November) suffers an accident in 1964 
involving its reactor(s) . Several crew members are killed. 
Western sources also mention two other accidents which should 
have occured in the mid 60s and whilzh involved the reactors. In 
the first case the submarine was a Hotel boat and 15-16 people 
were killed. In the second the submarine was a November class 
boat and 6-7 people were killed. Due to the vague and limited 
information available it is unclear whether these accidents 
involve 3, 2, 1 or no accidents. 
Comments: From the limited information available it can only 
be said that if the accidents are real, they have apparently 
involved the reactor system. However, the information is quite 
vague. They could be the July 1961. Soviet Hotel Class Submarine 
(K19) Accident, the 1964. Sovier, Nuclear Submarine (K27) 
Incident , the Feb. 1965 Soviet November Class Submarine (K-11) 
Accident or the Nov. 1965. Soviet E:cho-I Class Submarine (K74) 
Accidents. 
Therefore these events will be neglected. 
Feb. 1965. Soviet November Class Submarine (K11) Accident 
According to Russian information on February 12 (lo?) , 1965, 
a November class nuclear submarine of the Northern Fleet, K11, 
suffered a criticality accident during refueling at the I1Zvez- 
dochka" shipyard in Severodvinsk. According to a western source 
the core contained only new fuel at the time of the accident. 
During the refueling operation the pressure vessel lid was lifted 
by use of a crane. There was a permissible limit for the height 
to which the lid was allowed to be :Lifted. However, this height 
limit was not indicated correctly and not checked. Also no 
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neutron detectors were in operation. The lid was lifted to0 high 
up above the vessel. The regulation rods were attached to the 
lid, and when they were moved out of the core, an uncontrolled 
chain reaction was started in the reactor. Radioactive steam was 
ejected from the reactor and part of the crew was exposed to 
radiation. The lid fe11 down in a til-ted position on top of the 
pressure vessel. At the same time a fire started in the reactor 
compartment. The fire was fought, first with CO, fire-extin- 
guishers, with fresh water and finally with salt water. A total 
of 250 t water was used. The water became radioactive with an 
activity of 0.001 Curie per liter. The water was not contained in 
the reactor compartment, but spread to other compartments. 7 
persons suffered radiation injuries. The reactor compartment had 
to be replaced. The damaged compartment was the same year ( 1 9 6 5 )  
dumped in the Abrosimov Gulf on the east side of Novaya Zemlya 
with damaged fuel in one reactor. 
A western source claim that there was two criticality 
accidents in the reactor. The first 011 April 7th when the lid was 
first lifted. Then all personnel were withdrawn. The next 5 days 
the experts tried to find the reason for the accident. However, 
they came to the wrong conclusions, and on the February 12th the 
lid was lifted again. The reactor went critical again and a fire 
started. 
Another western source claims that the reason for the 
accident was that too much fuel wiis loaded into one of the 
reactor. 
A third western source claims tihat the submarine involved 
was the liquid-metal cooled K27 subm,xine, that the radioactive 
cloud emitted moved towards Severodvinsk, and that dammage caused 
by the accident was so severe that t;he reactor compartment was 
cut out and dumped in Ambrosimova Bay at Novaya Zemlya. It was 
obviously not the K27 submarine (cf. May 1968. Soviet Nuclear 
Submarine (K27) Accident) . 
Comments: The accident was ct criticality accident in 
connection with refueling and consequently the reactor system was 
involved. 
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Nov. 1965. Soviet Echo-I Class Submarine (K74) Accident 
On November 11, 1965, the starboard turbine of an Echo-I 
class Soviet nuclear submarine of t.he Northern Fleet, K74, was 
destroyed due to failure of an automatic Control system (gear 
box?) and subsequent turbine run-awa.y. The incident did not claim 
any casualties. 
According to a rather vague report a radiation incident took 
place in 1965 in the Sargasso Sea i.n a first generation Soviet 
submarine (November, Echo or Hotel). Whether this incident, if 
real, could be the same as the incident mentioned above is un- 
known. It could also be one of the accidents mentioned in: Mid 
1960s. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accidents. 
Comments: The accident did not involve the reactor system, 
but the propulsion system. 
Autumn 1966. Icebreaker NS Lenin Accident 
According to western raw intelligence reports one of the 3 
reactors of the Soviet icebreaker NS Lenin suffered a core melt- 
down in a sudden, catastrophic accident in 1966-67. Up to 30 
people may have died and many others were affected by radiation 
sickness. The ship was abandoned for over one year before 
replacement of the old 3 reactors with 2 new could begin. Another 
report states that NS Lenin suffered a nuclear related casualty. 
There was also rumors that NS Lenin had been disposed of by 
sinking following the accident; these were of course untrue since 
NS Lenin continued its operation with the new reactors from 
1970/71 until 1989. 
Recently, Russian information has become available of the 
NS Lenin accident in the autumn of :L966. At this time the three 
reactors of the Lenin nuclear power plant were undergoing their 
second refueling. Due to an operator error the water was drained 
from the core of the second reactor hefore the refueling, and the 
core was left without water for some time. The decay heat of the 
core and the lack of cooling caused partial melting of part of 
the core. When after the accident the fuel was to be removed, it 
was possible to remove only 94 of the irradiated fuel elements. 
The remaining 125 elements could not be withdrawn from the core. 
The damaged fuel had to be removed from the reactor tank by 
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removal of the core insert or basket consist- ing of the bottom 
grid plate and the cylindrical thermal shield. 
No information has so far been made available on the details 
of the accident or on the number of casualties, if any. 
The old reactor power plant with three OK-150 reactors was 
dumped in the Tsivolka Bay on the eastern side of Novaya Zemlya 
in 1967. 
In the west it has been claimed that NS Lenin was towed to 
the position of dumping, and that. here the whole reactor 
compartment was cut out of the hul1 by use of explosives and 
dumped directly to the sea bottom. Thi.s claim is not correct. The 
damaged power plant was cut out i n  Severodvinsk. The total 
activity of the dumped power plant has been estimated to be about 
50 kCi, mainly 6oCo. 
NS Lenin was later provided with a new nuclear power plant, 
Since the damaged fuel could not be removed from the core 
basket, it was filled by a furfurol-based mixture, lifted out of 
the reactor tank and placed in a reimforced concrete container 
with a steel casing. The container was then disposed of by 
dumping in the sea, close to the dumping place of the Lenin power 
plant. The total activity of the damped fuel at the time of 
disposal was about 100 kCi, about 50 kCi 137CsI about 50 kCi 'OST 
and about 2 kCi 238Pu, 241Am, and 244Cm. The dumping of the fuel took 
also place in 1967. 
Comments: The loss-of-coolant accident which NS Lenin 
suffered may have t o  do with t h e  fact t h a t  unlike modern 
pressurized water reactors the OK-150 reactors had only the 
coolant outlet (and not the coolant inlet) placed above the top 
of the core. In OK-150 the inlet is placed at the bottom of the 
pressure vessel. Thus the draining cif the core could be due to 
the opening of a valve in the inlet zube. 
containing two KLT-40 reactors, and continued its operation. 
1966. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports a leak 
developed around 1966 in the reactor shielding of a Soviet 
nuclear submarine of the November class, when it was close t o  t h e  
port of Polyarnyy on the Kola Peninsula. The Captain requested 
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permission to proceed directly to the shipyard. The permission 
was not granted, but the Captain took the boat there neverthe- 
less. A special brigade was formed to repair the submarine and 
part of the crew was sent to a special health center on an island 
near Murmansk to be treated for radiation sickness. Those sent to 
the center never returned. 
Comments: A leak in the reactor shielding system should not 
give rise to a serious radiation accident, provided the reactor 
is shut down immediately. The purpose of the water in the shield 
is to cool the shield and to slow-down the fast neutrons so that 
they can be absorped. As soon as th.e reactor is shut-down, the 
neutrons disappear and the need for the water for shielding and 
cooling is much reduced. The shielding water system is separated 
from the reactor cooling systems and run at low temperature. 
Further, the water looses its radioactivity rapidly after shut- 
down. If the accident is real there seems to be inconsistencies 
in the available information. The description of the event would 
make much more sense if the leak had been in the primary circuit 
of the nuclear propulsion system. 
The account of the event is very similar to that of the May 
1968 Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident, and is likely to be 
identical to that event. According to Russian information the 
accident described above has not take place. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Sep. 1967. Soviet November Class Submarine (K3) Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports the Soviet 
nuclear-powered attack submarine Leninskiy Komsomol of the 
November class suffered a fire accident near the North Pole on 
Sep. 8th, 1967, while sailing under the ice. The accident 
involved crew members being burned inside a compartment that was 
locked from the outside on both sides. The fire was caused by a 
spark of oxygen(?) and did not involve the nuclear propulsion 
system. The submarine was saved, but an unknown number of the 
crew members suffered burns. Several. crew members died. 
According to Russian information the K3 submarine of the 
Northern Fleet , the f irst Soviet nuclear submarine, suf fered a 
fire in the first and second compartment when the submerged 
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submarine was in the Norwegian Sea on its way back to base after 
having spent 56 days on patrol. K 3  was the first Soviet submarine 
to reach and surface at the North P o l e  (in July 1962), but there 
is no Russian information confirming that this accident occured 
near the North Pole. The fire started 1700 nautical miles from 
base. A hydraulic pipeline in the first compartment sprang a leak 
and the inflammable oil used at that time in the system caused a 
short-circuit in a lamp whereby the fire was started in the first 
compartment. A burning oil beam broke through a bulkhead and 
burned all crew members present in the 1st and the port part of 
2nd compartment. Another version states that when an attempt was 
made to evacuate crew members in the 1st compartment, the fire 
spread to the 2nd. The personel in the starboard part of the 2nd 
compartment died due to CO suffocation. Another version states 
that the automatic extinguishing system was based on CO,, and 
when that was applied, it killed any survivors in the 1st and 2nd 
compartment. When the bulkhead door hetween the 2nd and the 3rd 
compartment was opened to see what happened to the crew members 
in the 2nd compartment, toxic gases entered immediately the third 
compartment where the command centre is located and made several 
persons unconscious. A special brigade of the 4th compartment 
evacuated the personnel of the 3rd compartment. The 1st and 2nd 
compartments were sealed off and the submarine surfaced. 4 days 
later the submarine returned to base. A total of 39 crew members 
died from the accident. 
One western source claim that the accident also involved the 
cooling system, that the submarine was towed to Severodvinsk 
where the reactor compartment was cut out and replaced by a new. 
There seems to be no support for these claims. It is true that 
the original reactor compartment of K:3 was replaced by a new one, 
but the reason for the replacement was that the quality of the 
original one was not good enough. The original reactor compart- 
ment was dumped at the Abrosimov Gul? at Novaya Zemlja in 1965, 
but without fuel in any of the two reactors. 
Cornment: The accident had nothfhg to do with the nuclear 
power plant. The cause of the fire g.iven in the western sources 
sounds strange since oxygen in itself does not give rise to 
sparks. The Russian explaination is inuch more credible. 
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Dec. 1967. US Nuclear Submarine Accident(s1. 
According to press reports a US ballistic-missile nuclear 
submarine suffered serious damage during maneuvers in northern 
waters shortly before Christmas 196-7. The information about the 
accident should have come from unidentified sources at the US 
Naval Base in Rota in Spain. It was suggested in press reports 
that the damage was caused by the pressure change during a dive 
to large depth. 
There has also been press reports that a US submarine 
collided with a Soviet submarine in the Atlantic or Mediterranian 
in early 1968, causing severe damage to the US submarine which 
spent two month for repair at the Rota base. 
Comments: The two accident, if real, could be one accident. 
Whether one or two, they had nothing to do with the nuclear power 
plant. In the former case it seems to have involved a sea-water 
leak into the submarine, in the latter a collision with another 
submarine which could have caused a sea-water leak. 
1967. Soviet November Class Submarine Incident 
According to unknown sources a Soviet November class 
nuclear-powered attack submarine had a mishap in the Mediterra- 
nean which is believed to be related to its propulsion system. 
The submarine was towed to base. 
Comments: The available inforniation on the event is very 
meager. According to Russian information such an incident did not 
take place. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
May 1968. US SSN Scorpion Accident 
The US attack submarine SSN Scorpion sank en route from 
Gibraltar to Norfolk, Virginia, on May 22, 1968 at a position 
about 650 km southwest of the Azores at a depth of 3600 m. All 99 
men on board were killed. The submarine was split in two major 
parts by the accident. The forward hull section including the 
torpedo room and most of the operations compartment is located in 
a trench, formed through the impact of the submarine section with 
the sea bottom. The sail is detac:hed. The aft hull section, 
including the reactor and the engine compartments, is located in 
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a separate trench. The aft section of the engine room is inserted 
forward into the larger diameter hull section in a manner similar 
to a telescope. The submarine was cariiying 2 nuclear tipped Mark 
45 ASTOR torpedoes. The warheads were low-yield tactical nuclear 
weapons. These weapons contain a plutonium and uranium core. It 
is likely that the plutonium and the uranium has corroded into 
heavy, insoluble oxides soon after t.he sinking and that these 
materials remain inside the torpedo room. If they were released 
outside the submarine they would settle at the sea bottom due to 
their high density and insolubility. 
Naval Inquiry Court concluded that the certain cause of the 
loss of Scorpion cannot be ascertained from any available 
evidence. One month prior to the acci.dent SSN Scorpion collided 
with a barge in the harbour of Naples during a storm, and the 
barge sank. Divers inspected the hull of the submarine and found 
no damage. It has recently been claimed that the most likely 
cause of the sinking of SSN Scorpion was due to a conventional 
torpedo explosion. According to this theory one of the con- 
ventional torpedoes somehow became armed. The crew jettisoned the 
torpedo to get rid of it. However, since the torpedo was designed 
to home on a sonic signal from a vessel. Since the submarine was 
the only sonic source in the vicinity, the torpedo turned around 
and hit the submarine, bursting its hull. Another theory is that 
the torpedo exploded inside the submarine. This does not seem to 
agree with the fact that the submarine was split in two parts of 
roughly equal size by the accident. An torpedo explosion should 
have taken place in the front end of the submarine. After the 
accident the US Navy made a thourough review of the torpedo 
safety systems and introduced a niimber of modifications. A 
Russian source claims that Scorpion had not undergone all the 
modifications which were decided after the sinking of NSS 
Thresher. 
The area of the accident has been monitored for radioac- 
tivity in 1968, 1979 and 1986. None of the samples collected 
showed any evidence of release of radiocativity from the reactor 
fuel. Only very low 6oCo concentrations, corrosion products from 
the reactor circuit, were detected in sediment samples; the 
maximum concentration of 6oCo was measured to be 1.2 pCi/g. This 
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is more than a factor of 10 lower than the natura1 radioactivity 
of the sediment. No 6oCo was found in fish or other marine life 
specimens. 
Comments: There is no indication that the nuclear power 
plant was involved in the accident. 
May 1968. Soviet Nuclear Submarine (K27) Accident 
According to Russian information an experimental Soviet 
nuclear submarine, K27 of the Northern Fleet with two liquid 
metal cooled reactors suffered a reactor accident on May 24th, 
1968. The hul1 of the submarine was that of a November class 
submarine. 
The submarine became operational in November 1963. The two 
reactors were both cooled by a 1iqu:Ld alloy of lead and bismuth 
and the neutrons causing the fission reactions were of interme- 
diate energy. After some years of operation a refueling of the 
reactors was carried out successfully. However, there were 
problems with leakage in the steani generators, in particular 
those of the port reactor. This leakage caused oxidation of the 
coolant whereby particle matter was formed. This material could 
block the coolant flow through the reactor core. For this reason 
the reactor designer required that the coolant was cleaned for 
particle matters with regular interval. In May 1968 K27 was 
ordered to participate in a naval exercise in spite of the fact 
that the reactors needed a clean-up of the coolant. The leading 
officers protested, but had to follow orders, and the submarine 
left the base on a test run .  
On May 24th K27 was sailing at maximum power, testing the 
reactor parameters. Suddenly the power meters of the starboard 
reactor started to oscillate, and shortly after the power of the 
port reactor decreased to 7% of the maximum level. The port 
reactor was shut down. 
After a leak (presumably in a steam generator of the port 
reactor) the coolant flow in parts of the core was blocked and 
the fuel overheated and melted. Hereby at least 20% of the fuel 
elements were damaged and radioactive material released to the 
primary circuit and to the safety buffer tank and from here to 
the reactor compartment. The radiation level in this room was 
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above 100 Rontgen/hour. The radioactive contamination spread to 
the other compartments. The radiatio:n alarm was activated, all 
doors between compartments were closed, and the submarine sailed 
towards its base at Gremikha in the Iokanga bay by use of the 
starboard reactor. 
Due to the radioactive contamination of the submarine it was 
decided to surface to ventilate the compartments even though it 
ment longer travelling time back to the base. The speed at the 
surface was only 15 knots. Crew meinbers tried to reduce the 
contamination from the damaged reactor. When the K27 approached 
the base, the leadership of the base suggested that the submarine 
should stay outside harbour and work on the overheated reactor 
there. But due to the radiological and technical situation on 
board K27 went straight to the quay where the submarine was 
moored. 
The total crew was 124 men, of which 27 were officers. 12 
crew members received dosis in the range of 600 to 1000 Rontgen. 
They were all hospitalized. 5 died, 4 of radiation and one 
suffocated in his gas mask. Later Russian information claims 9 
dead due to radiation injury. 
K27 stayed in Gremikha where the starboard reactor served 
as a test bed for liquid metal cooled reactors. The coolant of 
the port reactor was kept liquid by heating with steam from the 
starboard reactor. After 13 years the heating was removed and the 
coolant was permitted to solidify in both reactors. Extensive 
decontamination experiments were also carried out in the sub- 
marine. 
In December 1973 K27 was towed to Severodvinsk where it had 
been buiit. In the reactor rooms the drive mechanisms for the 
Control rods and the ionization chambers were removed, and all 
holes closed. The primary circuit was filled with liquid metal 
and the empty volume of the reactor rooms was filled with 
furfurol and bitumen. Finally K27 was in 1981 towed to the Stepo- 
voy Inlet near Novaya Zemlya and sunk at 20 m depth with fuel in 
both reactors. The activity of the reactor fuel was about 200 kCi 
at the time of the sinking. 
Comments: The accident w a s  a c l ea r  reac tor  accident, caused 
by insufficient cleaning of the coolant and resulting in a l o s s -  
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of-coolant accident. 
A u g .  1968. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine (IC1401 Accident 
According to Russian information a Yankee ciass nuciear 
submarine of the Northern Fleet, K 1 4 0 ,  suffered a criticality 
accident in Severodvinsk on August 23rd, 1968. The wiring of the 
Control rods had not been done correctly. So when the power was 
switched on for a mechanical test of the Control rods - and with 
no neutron monitors operating - the rods moved out of the core 
instead of into the core, and the reactor went critical. The 
excess reactivity is said to have been 12%(?). Initially the 
personnel did not understand what happened. The power level 
reached 20 times the nominal power level and the pressure 800 
kg/cm2, 4 times the nominal. Presumably the reactor shut itself 
down due to the damage of the fuel which resulted from the power 
excursion. The reactor system was strongly contaminated due to 
the fuel damage, but there was no casualties. It seems as if the 
primary circuit did not leak. After some years the submarine was 
repaired. The damaged reactor was in 1972 dumped in the Novaya 
Zemlya Depression in the Kara Sea. 
Comments: The accident clearly involved a criticality 
accident. The reasons why there were no casulties are undoubtedly 
that the reactor vessel was closed and inside its shield and that 
the submarine hul1 was not open as it is during the refueling or 
defueling process. 
1968. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident? 
According to raw US intelligence reports a Soviet submarine , 
presumably nuclear powered, sank at the Kolskiy Zaliv estuary off 
Severomorsk at the Kola Peninsula. AI11 90 men on board died. When 
the submarine failed to return to klase at the expected time, a 
search was started one or two days :Later, and the submarine was 
found. When the submarine was recovered, it was determined that 
all food on board had been consumed. It was estimated that the 
submarine had been at the location for 30 days. 
Comments: No reason is given f o r  the sinking of the sub- 
marine. It should have been known s i n c e  the Submarine i s  said to 
have been recovered. Since all food on board was consumed, the 
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crew must have stayed alive for a significant number of days 
after the sinking. This again seems to indicate that the air 
cleaning and controlling system worked; else the crew would have 
died much faster due to suffocation. This system needs energy, 
and therefore it seems as if the reactor system has worked. Since 
the submarine sank not far from Severcimorsk and at shallow water, 
the crew could have used the active sonar system (which needs 
power) or the emergency buoy system to signal its distress to its 
base. Thus the available information does not sound very 
coherent . 
It may also be mentioned that according to Russian infor- 
mation only two sunken submarines have been recovered by the 
Soviet navy: S80 and K429 (see June 1983. Soviet Charlie-II Class 
Submarine Accident). S80 was a diesel submarine of the Northern 
Fleet which sank to a depth of 200 m om January 27th, 1961, with 
its crew of 68 men. It was recovered. in 1969. Information from 
Russia states that this accident has never happened. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Apr. 1970. Soviet November Class Submarine (K8) Accident 
According to western sources a Soviet November class attack 
submarine was sighted dead in the Nater in heavy sea 480 km 
north-west of Spain on April 11 1970. Crew members was seen on 
the deck trying to rig a tow-line to two nearby Soviet merchant 
ships. Therefore, the submarine was helleved to have suffered a 
propulsion failure. Some sources say that there was an internal 
fire in the boat. On the following morning US Navy P-3 pa t ro l  
planes found only two oil slicks on zhe surface at the position 
where the submarine had been seen, i.e. at a position of 47"25'N, 
19"40'W. It was assumed that submarine had been lost, and that 
the crew had been picked up by the two Soviet merchant ships. One 
source claims that lifes were lost when the crew tried to prevent 
the fire from reaching the nuclear power plant. The submarine may 
have carried two nuclear torpedoes. 
Af ter the accident Soviet survey vessels guarded the area 
for six months. Thereafter the Soviet Navy conducted routine 
patrols of the area until 1979. After 1979 only occational visits 
were made. 
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According to Russian sources t.wo fires started simultane- 
ously in the November class nuclear submarine K8 of the Northern 
Fleet when the submarine was sailing submerged in the Biscayan 
Bay on April 8th, 1970, returning from the exercise OKEAN. One 
fire started in the third (centra:L) compartment, one in the 
eighth compartment. The automatic shut-down system of the 
reactors stopped their operation, ILeaving the submarine prac- 
tically without power, since the diesel power plant could not be 
started. The submarine surfaced, and the crew tried to fight the 
fire without success. The Control room and many other compart- 
ments were filled with fumes from the fires. Air was pumped into 
the aft ballast tanks to keep the submarine floating. However, on 
April 10th the air supply had been exhausted, and water started 
to flow into the 7tn and 8th compartment. K8 sank at 06.20 of 
April 11th at a depth of 4680 m. 52 of the crew members, 
including the Captain, died during the accident. 
The exists in raw western intelligence reports a record of 
another accident with a Soviet nuclear submarine which should 
have taken place in April-May 1970 near the Faroe Islands. It 
also involved a fire and a great l o s s  of life. When the fire 
spread towards the reactor, the Captain ordered the personel to 
abandon the submarine, the interior of the boat was flooded to 
prevent the fire from reaching the reactor room and the submarine 
sank. Since the description of this second event is almost 
identical to the first except for the geographical location and 
since the first event has been descri-bed by Russian sources while 
the second has not, there is every reason to believe that there 
was only one event. The mistake concerning the location could be 
explained in the following way. The accident took place 480 km 
north west of Spain or about 480 kri south west of Britain. The 
latter position could have been mistaken for 480 km north west of 
Britain which is close to the Faroe Islands. 
Comments: The cause of the accident was fires which from the 
information available had no connection to the reactor system. 
1970. Soviet Charlie-II Class Submarine (K320) Accident 
According to Russian sources a Soviet nuclear submarine of 
the Charlie-II type, K320, suffered a criticaiity accident at the 
29 
end of its construction period at the shipyard "Krasnoye Sormovoll 
in Gorki (now Nizhniy Novgorod). The fuel had been loaded into 
the reactor, but only provisional Control rods had been instal- 
led. Hydraulic tests of the primary circuit were performed. 
During these tests the provisional rotis which had not been fixed 
sufficiently were lifted out of the core by the high velocity of 
the water coolant, and the reactor went critical. The accident 
resulted in the release of radioactive water to factory hall. The 
reactor and its fuel was later replaced. 
Western sources claim that the accident a l so  involved a 
fire, but this is denied in Russian information. 
Comments: The accident was clearly a criticality accident. 
Since the factory hall was contaminated there must have been 
access from the primary circuit to the hall. It might be that the 
reactor and the submarine hul1 was open to the surroundings, but 
no information is available on this question. 
Apr. 1971. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine Incident/Accident? 
According to western sources a Yankee submarine experienced 
Comments: The very limited information available does not 
unknown problems in the Pacific in April 1971. 
seem to indicate a serious accident, if at all real. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
1971. Soviet Submarine Radiation Incident/Accident? 
According to a rather vague report a radiation accident 
(November, occured in 1971 in a Soviet first generation submarine 
Echo or Hotel). 6 persons were involved. 
Comments: With the limited information available it is not 
possible to comment on the accident, if at all real. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Feb. 1972. Soviet Hotel-II Class Submarine (K19) Accident 
According to western sources a US Navy P-3 Orion patrol 
plane sighted and photographed a Soviet ballistic-missile Hotel- 
II class nuclear submarine on the surface about 1000 km north 
east of New Foundland on Feb. 24th., 1972. The submarine had 
apparently lost all power. Later the submarine started its 
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journey back to its home base through heavy, stormy seas, moving 
at low speed and accompanied by a number of Soviet ships. On 
March 18th the submarine was still moving across the north 
Atlantic. On April 5th the boat had reached its home waters in 
the White Sea. Several deaths were thought to have occurred, but 
the basis for this claim was not given. 
According to Russian information the Hotel class submarine 
K19 (cf. July 1961) suffered a fire at 10.23 in the morning of 
Feb. 24th, 1972, while sailing subnierged in the Atlantic at a 
depth of 120 m on the way back to its base after a patrol. K19 
was expected to reach its base in 8 days. 
The fire started in the 9th compartment, which contained 
auxilliary installations, the galley and some cabins, arranged in 
3 floors. The fire was caused by oil from the hydraulic system 
controlling the rudder. The oil had come in contact with an 
apparatus for combustion of CO and started a fire. Some days 
before a leak had been repaired in a tube of the hydraulic 
system, and either the repair had not been well done or the 
spilled oil had not been properly cleaned up. The sailor who 
discovered the fire went to wake thc? person responsible for the 
apparatus instead of giving the alarm and start fighting the 
fire. Hereby precious time was lost , .  Alarm was given, and the 
fire figting was started. However, the crew was not provided with 
gas masks and several lost consciousness due to the combustion 
gases. The fire caused the main pipeline with compressed air to 
explode, and this air release promoted the fire. The smoke spread 
through the ventilation system to the next compartment, the 8th, 
which contained the Control room of the reactor. Gas masks were 
used where available, but not always with success because they 
had not been adapted to the persons to use them. The 9th 
compartment was evacuated, and all personel in compartment 8 that 
was not indispensible, was sent to the forward parts of the 
submarine. 
The submarine tried to get to th.e surface. Unfortunately the 
fire spread to the 8th compartment where the electric generators 
were situated. The CO also reached the reactor Control room, the 
reactors were closed down and the room evacuated. The 7th 
compartment which contained steam turbines, was also filled with 
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smoke . 
With the reactor shut down, the electricity disappeared. 
Attempts were made to start the emergency diesel generators in 
the 5th compartment, but they were not successful due to darkness 
and the smoke. When leaving the 5th compartment the personel 
forgot to close the air valves and nearly 200 t water entered the 
compartment and drowned the diesel generators, the main ventila- 
tion system and equipment for remote Control of the reactor. 
In the meantime the submarine had reached the surface where 
a storm was approaching. 
12 crew members remained in the 10th compartment which 
contained quarters and two torpedo lamching tubes and torpedoes. 
Due to the fire in the 9th compartment they were isolated. For a 
while they could communicate with the 1st compartment, but the 
fire interrupted the connection. Air was supplied to the 10th 
compartment through a pipeline ordinarily used for the balancing 
system and contaminated air was renloved through the drinking 
water system. The crew members obtained drinking water by 
collection water condensing on the cuter walls of the compart- 
ment. However, they had very little food. They were not relieved 
until March 18th. 
Salvage and other ships had arrived, but due to the storm 
it was not possible for a long period to send assistence to K19. 
Later 40 crew members were transfered to these ships by use of 
helicopters and one of the ships isupplied K19 with air and 
electricity. Crew members were a l s o  transfered to one of the 
ships by use of a cable, connecting the ship to the top of the 
sail of the submarine. Fresh personel was transfered to the 
submarine. Finally K19 was towed back to Severomorsk where it 
arrived on April 4th. 
The accident cost the life of 3 0  crew members of which 28 
were killed by the fire. 
Another Russian source reports on an almost identical 
accident of K19, but on the 23rd of September 1972. The latter 
report must be due to a misprint. 
Comments: The fire was not irtitiated in the propulsion 
system, but it spread in the submarine and caused shut-down of 
the reactors and thereby l o s s  of propulsion. No radioactivity 
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release seems to have been involved in the accident. 
Mar. 1972. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine Accident? 
On March 16th, 1972, a Yankee class submarine was sighted at 
the surface northeast of Iceland. It was assumed that the 
submarine had experienced problems. 
Comments: The information available on this event is very 
limited. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Dec. 1972 - Jan 1973. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine Accident 
Raw western intelligence reports have mentioned two 
accidents which involved radiation accidents in Soviet nuclear 
submarines in the Atlantic. 
The first occurred in December 1972 off the U.S. Atlantic 
coast in the mine-torpedo department in the forward section of 
the submarine and involved a nuclear leakage from a nuclear 
torpedo. Doors were immediately shut: and some crew members were 
trapped within the Space where the ra.diation leakage had occured. 
The trapped crew initially consurned dry rations that were 
permanently stored in the compartmerit. Later they received food 
through a small opening from the weather deck. Upon arrival in 
Severomorsk the crew members was allowed to disembark. Several 
men died shortly after the accident,, others later. The majority 
of the crew suffered from some form of radiation sickness. 
The second accident occurred in December 1972 or in January 
1973. An undetermined accident crippled a Soviet nuclear 
submarine in the Atlantic. The submarine was towed at a speed of 
two to three knots for six weeks to Severomorsk on the Kola 
Peninsula. The crew was trapped in the forward Space , initially 
consuming dry rations that were permanently stored in the 
compartment. Later they received focid through a small opening in 
the weather deck. Upon arrival in Severomorsk, the crew members 
were allowed to leave the submarine. Several died shortly after 
the accident, others later. The majority of the crew suffered 
radiation sickness. 
Since the time and the latter part of the two stories is 
practical identical, they deal in a.11 probability with the same 
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accident and should be considered as one accident. The submarine 
has been reported to be a Yankee class ballistic missile 
submarine. 
Comments: The report of the first accident seems rather 
strange. Nuclear torpedos do contain radioactive materials 
(plutonium and/or uranium) on solid, not liquid or gaseous form, 
and they are provided with an outer, protective casing. Even if 
the outer casing was damaged due to e.g. a fa11 of the torpedo, 
the escape of radioactivity would be small, and there seems to be 
no reason for locking up the crew menibers in the torpedo room. 
The second accident could be due to a reactor accident 
involving fuel damage and release Df radioactivity into the 
compartments around the reactor, but this is pure speculation. It 
could explain that the submarine was towed back to base, and that 
the crew moved to the forward compart-ment, as far away from the 
contaminated parts of the submarine as possible. It could also 
explain why the majority of the crew members suffered radiation 
sickness. However, according to Russian information none of these 
events have occurred. 
Therefore these events will both be neglected. 
1972. Soviet Alfa Class Submarine (K377) Accident 
According to Russian sources an Alfa class submarine, K377, 
suffered a reactor accident in 1972 dnring sea trials. The liquid 
metal coolant (Pb-Bi) solidified. It was not possible to remelt 
it and to get the fuel out. The submarine was subsequently 
dismantled. The reactor compartment was filled with furfurol and 
bitumen. It was the intension to dump it in the Kara Sea. 
However, before it could be done, the Soviet Union signed the 
London convention. Instead of dumping the reactor compartment is 
stored at a naval base. 
Comments: The accident was clearly a loss-of-cooling 
accident. 
Apr. 1973. US SSN Guardfish Incident 
On April 21st, 1973, the US nuclear attack submarine SSN 
Guardfish experienced a leak in the primary cooling circuit while 
sailing submerged 600 km south-southwest of Purget Sound, 
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Washington. The boat surfaced, ventilated, decontaminated and 
closed the leak without external as,sistance. Four crew members 
were later transfered to the Purget Sound Naval Hospital for 
check of radioactivity contamination. 
Comments: Though some claim that this was an accident it is 
difficult to see the basis of such claim. It is a type of event 
which can be expected to occur once in a while. The important 
thing is the size of the leak and the ability of the reactor 
system to replace the leaking water so that the reactor remains 
cooled until it can be repaired. It is true that had the leakage 
been larger and had the emergency core cooling system failed the 
event could certainly have developed into an accident. 
June. 1973. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine (K56) Accident 
According to western sources a Echo-II class submarine, K 5 6 ,  
collided on June 14th, 1973 in the Pacific Ocean near Nahodka 
with a Soviet research vessel Akaldernik Berg. 27 people were 
killed. Another western source clairns that the K56-accident was 
a reactor accident, that it took place on June 13th and that 27 
persons were killed. 
Comments: It is obvious that there can only have been one 
accident, either a collision or a reactor accident. Since the 
information available on the collision is much more detailed it 
is believed that the accident involved a collision. As mentioned 
in the introduction collisions are in general not considered in 
this compilation. However, due to the loss of lives, an exception 
is made here. It is not clear whether the 27 people killed 
belonged to the research vessel or the submarine. 
Aug. 1973. Soviet Yankee Class (K219) Accident 
According to a western source a Soviet Yankee class bal- 
listic missile submarine, K219, suffered a missile tube accident 
in the Atlantic on August 31st, 1973. One person was reported 
killed. 
Comments: Due to the limited amount of information it is not 
possible to assess the severity oii the accident/incident. It 
obviously did not involve t h e  nuclear power plant, but could, if 
real, have involved a nuclear warhead. According to Russian 
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information this accident did not occur. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Apr. 1974. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine (K420) Incident/Ac- 
cident 
According to Russian informatiorL a Yankee submarine of the 
Northern Fleet, K420, suffered a fire in the 10th compartment on 
April 6th, 1974. There was no casualties. 
Comments: With the limited information available it is not 
possible to assess the incident/acci.dent except to state that 
there is no indication that the nuclear power plant was involved. 
Later Russian information have stated that this event never took 
place. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Mar. 1976. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident 
According to western sources a Soviet nuclear submarine 
(class unknown) suffered in March 1976 a fire in the turbogenera- 
tor after a patrol of 70 days in the Pacific. The event occured 
near Petropavlovsk. The submarine ?ilmost sank after loosing 
power. 
Comments: The accident did involve the propulsion system, 
but not the reactor system. Whether the submarine llalmostll sank, 
is a subjective judgement and therefore difficult to assess. 
Sep. 1976. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine (K47) Accident 
According to a western source t.he Echo-II class submarine 
K47 sailed in September 1976 in the 13arent Sea on on its way to 
the home base when a fire broke up in the 8th compartment. 8 crew 
members dies from injuries. 
Comments: There is no incication that the accident involved 
the nuclear power plant. 
Oct. 1976. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports a fire started 
in the missile launch compartment of a Soviet Yankee class 
nuclear submarine with ballistic niissiles on patrol in the 
Atlantic in October 6th, 1976. Three officers were killed 
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according to one source. The submarine returned to base on its 
own power. 
Comments: The nuclear power plant was obviously not involved 
in the accident, but radioactivity could have been released if 
the warheads of the missiles were damaged. According to Russian 
information this event did not take place. 
Therefore this event will be negelcted. 
1977. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports a Soviet Echo- 
II class cruise missile nuclear submarine suffered a fire in the 
Indian Ocean in 1977. The submarine surfaced in attempt to fight 
the fire which it took several days to extinguish. The submarine 
was towed to a port near Vladivostok by a Soviet trawler. 
Comments: Since the submarine was towed back to base, the 
propulsion plant, but not necessarily the reactor, seems to have 
been involved in the fire. 
1977. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Radiation Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports about 12 
Soviet naval officers, serving on a nuclear submarine in the 
Atlantic, were in 1977 taken from the submarine to Canada by a 
Soviet trawler. From here they returned to Leningrad on an 
Aeroflot flight. Intelligence sources suggest that this may have 
been a medical emergency connected with radiation exposure. 
Comments: The evidence that there was an radiation exposure 
is rather uncertain. If the event is real, the cause of the 
accident is unknown, but it is likely to have involved the 
reactor. According to Russian information this accident did not 
take place. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Aug. 1978. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine Incident 
According to western information a Soviet Echo-II class 
nuclear submarine was sighted dead in the water near Rockall 
Bank, 225 km north-west of Scotland in August 1978. It had 
appparently experienced problems wi.th its propulsion plant. On 
August 20th a US P - 3  Orion aircraft observed the submarine south 
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of the Faroe Islands, under tow towards its home base in the 
USSR. There is no indication of the cause of the propulsion 
problem or on any personnel casualties. 
Comments: The submarine obviously suffered a break-down of 
its propulsion system, but not necessarily of the reactor system. 
According to Russian information such an incident did not take 
place. It is nevertheless taken into account since the submarine 
was observed by western planes. It could have been a minor 
incident which was disregarded by the Northern Fleet. 
Sep. 1978. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine (K451) Accident/In- 
cident 
According to Russian informaticn a Soviet Yankee nuclear 
submarine of the Pacific Fleet, K451 suffered a fire in the 
compartment of the turbogenerators on September 2nd 1978. There 
was no casualties. 
Comments: With the limited information available it is not 
possible to asses the accident/incident. However the reactor 
system was not involved. 
Dec. 1978. Soviet Delta-I Class Submarine (K171) Accident 
According to Russian information a Delta-I class ballistic 
missile nuclear submarine of the Pacific Fleet, K171, suffered a 
reactor accident followed by incorrect actions by the crew on 
December 28th, 1978. 3 crew members (lied due to the accident. 
Comments: Due to the very limited information no assessment 
of the accident is possible except to say that it involved the 
reactor system. 
July 1979. Soviet Echo-I Class Submarine (K116) Accident 
According to western sources one of the two reactors of the 
Echo-I (-II?) nuclear submarine K116 of the Pacific fleet (Order 
No. 541) suffered a loss-of-coolant accident in July 1979 while 
at sea near Russia. The reason for the accident was a human 
error. The reactor Control panel of the submarine was placed in 
front and at the side of the operator, who often operated the 
switches on the side panel, while looking at the front panel. In 
the case of the accident the operator misplaced his hand and 
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operated a wrong switch whereby he turned off the main cir- 
culation pumps. The emergency core cooling system did not work, 
and due to the confusion that followed, the error was not 
rectified. The core was exposed, and part of the fuel melted. 
None of the crew members seems to have died because of radiation 
exposure and no radiation escaped to the outside. The submarine 
is now awaiting decommissioning at Pavlovsk submarine base of the 
Pacific fleet. 
Comments: As mentioned above the accident was due to human 
error. Even considering the confusion that followed after the 
mistaken switching-off of the main circulation pumps it is 
diff icult to understand that the error was not rapidly corrected. 
The reason could be an inexpedient display at the Control desk or 
insufficient training of the operators or both. 
Dec. 1979. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident 
According to a western source a Soviet nuclear submarine 
suffered a radiation accident and sunk in the Atlantic Ocean in 
December 1979. The number of casualties is not given. 
Comments: Such an accident has never been confirmed by other 
sources and is in contradiction with Russian information. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Late 1970s. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Accident 
According to a western source a Soviet ballistic missile, 
nuclear submarine jettisoned a nuclear warhead in the Pacific 
Ocean near the Soviet coast, possib:Ly near Petropavlovsk in the 
late 1970s. The warhead was later recovered. 
Comments: The accident did not affect the submarine and did 
not give rise to radioactive contamination. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Aug. 1980. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine Accident 
On August 21 1980 a Soviet Echo-II class cruise-missile 
nuclear submarine suffered an internal fire 460 km east of 
Okinawa according to one source. According to another the 
submarine suffered a fire in the propulsion area of the submarine 
140 km east of Okinawa. At least 9 crew members are believed dead 
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and 3 injured. A Soviet freighter evacuates the crew and a 
tugboat towed the submarine to Vladivostok, escorted by several 
warships. The USSR informed Japan that there was no radioactive 
leakage, but the Japanese subsequently reported evidence of 
radioactive contamination in water and air samples. How solid 
this evidence is, is not known. 
Comments: The submarine has obviously suffered a breakdown 
of its propulsion system. Since reaicitor compartment does not 
ordinarily contain large amounts of inflammable materials while 
the engine compartment does (oil in gear boxes, bearings etc.), 
the fire did probably start in this room. 
Sep. 1980. Soviet Nuclear(?) Submarine Accident 
According to raw western intelligence reports a Soviet 
nuclear submarine (class unknown) suffered when sailing in the 
Baltic Sea in September 1980 (one source says 1981) a series of 
strong and sudden physical shocks, and the boat was no longer 
navigable. An emergency was declared, and some crew members were 
sealed in the compartment where they were on duty. The submarine 
was taken on tow to Kaliningrad. The towing took 36 hours since 
it was only done during darkness. The crew members that had been 
sealed off were flown to Riga and hospitalized, showing signs of 
terminal radiation sickness. 
According to another source the submarine was a conventional 
Whiskey-class submarine which became involved in a collision 
whereby one of the torpedoes with nuclear warhead was damaged and 
radioactivity released and crew members exposed to radiation. 
Comments: From the available evidence it seems reasonable to 
assume that the event did not involve a nuclear submarine which 
never operated in the Baltic. This is confirmed by Russian 
information. Even if crew members had been present in the torpedo 
room during the collision and damage to the nuclear torpedo, it 
does not seem clear why they were isolated in this room. It is 
also not clear why the towing should only  be done during the 
night, in particular in a situation where some crew members were 
exposed to radiation. As is apparent from this report towing of 
Soviet submarines during the day is not something unique. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
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Sep. 1980. Soviet Nuclear Submarine (IC2221 Accident 
According to Russian information the submarine K222 suffered 
a criticality accident on September 30th, 1980, (one source says 
November 30th, 1980) when it was undergoing a major overhall at 
a shipyard in Severodvinsk. At a time when all the crew members 
had left for lunch and only shipyard personnel were present, the 
personnel supplied power to the ccmtrol rod drives while the 
instrumentation system was not activated. The rods moved out of 
the core, and due to a failure of the automatic Control system, 
the reactor went critical. As a result the core was damaged. One 
source claims that the primary circuit was Ildestroyedll. There was 
no casualties and no contamination cif the surroundings has been 
reported. The two reactors - not the reactor compartment - was 
dumped without fuel in the Techeniye Inlet at Novaya Zemlya in 
1988. 
Comments: The accident is clearly a criticality accident. 
The reasons for the lack of casualtles and the apparent lack of 
contamination could be that the reactor tank and also the 
submarine hul1 was not open to the surroundings. The fact that 
the reactors were dumped without fue:l, seems to indicate that the 
fuel damage was limited. This contributes also to reduce any 
release of radioactivity. 
1980. Soviet Delta-III Class Submarine Accident 
According to western sources a Soviet Delta III class 
submarine suffered a reactor accident in 1980. 2 persons were 
killed. 
Comments: It is not possible to comment on such limited 
information, if real. 
Apr. 1982. Soviet Alfa Class Submarine (K123) Accident 
According to Russian information a Alfa nuclear submarine of 
the Northern Fleet, K 1 2 3 ,  suffered an accident on April 8th, 
1982, during a patrol in the Barent Sea. The coolant of the 
primary circuit , a lead-bismuth alloy, solidified, and the 
submarine had to be towed back to base. 
A western source claims that the K123-accident took place on 
August 8th, 1982, and that it involved a leak of the liquid metal 
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cooling in the steam generator. Approximately two tons of the 
alloy leaked to the reactor compartment and the core of the 
reactor was damaged beyond repair. 
The recommissioning of the submarine which involved replace- 
ment of the reactor compartment, took 9 (8) years and was carried 
out at a shipyard in Severodvinsk. The accident claimed no 
casulties. 
Comments: This accident was clearly a loss-of-cooling 
accident, whether it involved solidifying or leakage of the 
coolant or both. 
June 1983. Soviet Charlie-I Class Submarine (K429) Accident 
According to western intelligence reports a Charlie-I class 
cruise-missile nuclear submarine sank somewhere east of the 
Soviet naval base at Petropavlosk, near the southern tip of the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. The cause of the accident was not given, but 
since there was no release of radioactivity it was probably a 
mechanical failure, not a nuclear reactor accident. Figures given 
for the number of crew members killed vary from unknown to 16 to 
all of the 90 persons on board. The submarine sank at a depth of 
50 m. The submarine was salvaged by the Soviet Navy in August 
1983. 
According to Russian information a Charlie-II class nuclear 
submarine from the Pacific Fleet, K429, should on June 24, 1983, 
perform a routine balancing test in the Krasheninnikov Bay to 
ajust the density of the submarine to that of the sea. The 
submarine was 60 t heavier than expected, i.e. it had negative 
buoyancy, and the crew members that should have checked the 
weight of the submarine, had not done this. When water was let 
into the ballast tanks, K429 sank to the bottom of the sea at a 
depth of 35 m. It did not help that all the depth meters were 
switched off. 
Water started entering K429 since all exits of the ven- 
tilation system had been left open hecause it was not intended 
that the submarine should submerge. Alarm was given and the 
Captain ordered the main ballast tank:; emptied. Unfortunately the 
operator used the wrong handle, and the compressed air did not 
enter the ballast tanks, but was released to the sea. Around 
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midnight all the valves of the ventilation system were finally 
closed. It had to be done manually since the remote operation 
system had been flushed by the incorning water and did not work. 
At this time the compressed air reserves were down to 308, not 
enough to raise the submarine. In addition K429 rested at the sea 
bottom with an inclination of 15"; this prevented the release of 
the emergency buoys and the rescue chamber by which 4 man could 
go to the surface. 
In some of the compartments the pressure increased and the 
temperature rose to 50 " C .  There was only diving equipment for 50 
persons while the crew consisted of 107 man. At dawn on the 25th 
June the two batteries, which supplied the electricity, exploded. 
Later this day two crew members deciided to leave the submarine 
through the vertical missile lauiiching tubes in the first 
compartment. They were immediately picked up by naval ships at 
the surface. Alarm had already been ordered when the air bubles 
from the air release were observed at the surface. 
The rescue work started at 23 o'clock in the evening. Divers 
brought diving sets down to the submarine and in 24 hours 104 
crew members were rescued. 2 (17?) crew members died during the 
operation. Before leaving the submarine the crew had prepared it 
for raising which took place some month later. After K429 had 
been repaired, it sank again at the shipyard, close to the quay. 
It is raised again and later - acccirding to a western source - 
used as a dock side trainer at the liibachiy submarine base. 
Comments: The nuclear propulsion system was not involved in 
the accident. 
Sep. 1983. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Accident 
According to a western source a Soviet nuclear submarine was 
observed dead in the Pacific Ocean and later sunk in September 
1983. No information is given on submarine class or casualties. 
Comments: Such an event has not been confirmed by other 
sources and is in contradiction with Russian information. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
June 1984. Soviet Echo-I Class Submarine (K131) Accident 
According to Russian information an Echo-I class nuclear 
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submarine, K131, suffered a fire in the electro-technical (the 
8th) compartment on June 18th 1984 while returning to its base at 
the Kola peninsula after a patrol. Th.e fire started when one of 
the crew members was working on some electric installations and 
his clothes caught fire. 13 or 14 crew members were killed by the 
accident. 
Comments: The information available on the fire does not 
indicate whether the nuclear power plant was involved in the 
accident or not. 
Aug. 1985. Soviet Echo-II Submarine Accident 
On August 10, 1985, an uncontrolled chain reaction suddenly 
occured in the port reactor of a nuclear submarine of the Echo-II 
class, that was completing refueling at a pier of the Naval 
shipyard in the town of Shkotovo-22 at the Chazhma Bay, Maritime 
Territory, about 60 km SSE of Vladivostok. One western source 
claimed that the submarine was a Victor Class submarine, but a 
picture of the submarine shows c1earl.y that it was a Echo class 
submarine and it has later been confirmed that it was a Echo-II 
submarine. The reactor had been refueled, but the lid of the 
reactor tank had not been placed properly and had to be relifted 
to be placed correctly. When this was done, the Control rods had 
not, in violation of the regulations, been detached from the 
drive mechanisms on the lid and were lifted out of the core. This 
caused an uncontrolled chain reactiori which resulted in a steam 
explosion. 
The steam explosion destroyed the forward and aft machine 
rooms and the forward compartment of the Control system. One 
freshly loaded fuel element was blown out of the reactor to a 
distance of 70-80 m, landing 30 m from the shore. The explosion 
also caused damage to the pressure hiil1 of the submarine in the 
aft portion of the reactor compartment. Immediately after the 
explosion a fire broke out. It was brought under Control after 4 
hours. The combustion products along with fission products, 
activation products and particles of unburned fuel fe11 down in 
the form of fine particles or slurrie:; over an area with a radius 
of 50-100 m around the submarine. The dose rate exceeded 600 
R/hr. 
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A radioactive plume moved in northwestern direction towards, 
but never reached, Vladivostok. It intersected the Dunay 
(Shkotovo) peninsula and extended towards the coast of the Ussiri 
Inlet. The plume width was several hundred meters, and its length 
about 6 km. Fall-out of aerosol particles occurred in the Ussuri 
Inlet up to 30 km from the submarine. 
The release of radioactive material into the atmosphere was 
7 MCi of which 2 MCi was noble gases. 7.5 hours after the 
accident the dose rate in the area of the accident reached 0.25- 
0.5 R/hr. Submarines and special vessels near the accident site 
piers and the shipyard structures were significantly contamina- 
ted. A large part of the Chazhma Bay was was contaminated due to 
the fall-out from the plume and due t.o radioactive water from the 
reactor compartment entering the water through the hole formed in 
the pressure hull. Two month after th.e accident the radioactivity 
of the seawater was back to the background level. 
During the accident and the clean-up, 290 persons did 
receive significant radiation doses. 10 persons died (instantly?) 
of their injuries (8 officers arid 2 sailors) . 1 0  persons 
developed radiation sickness, and 39 displayed radiation 
reactions. Another source reports that according to calculations 
by the Russian navy only Ira handful of individualsll received more 
than 140 rads and that most exposurcss were around 2 to 4 Rad. 
No attempt was made to repair the submarine which initially 
stayed at the dockside of the Chazma facility. Later it was moved 
to the Pavlovsk submarine base. 
Conunents: The accident was cletir refueling accident. 
Dec. 1985. Soviet Echo-II/Charlie Class Submarine Accident 
According to a western source the reactor of a Charlie class 
submarine (K314) overheated while the submarine was returning to 
base outside Vladivostok in December 1985. Another western 
sources claims that it was a Echo-II class submarine (K431) of 
the Pacific fleet that suffered overheating of the reactor (loss- 
of-coolant accident) while at sea in December 1985. According to 
both sources the submarine is now awaiting decommissioning at the 
submarine base of the Pacific Fleet at Pavlovsk. The two 
accidents are so similar that they are in all probability the 
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same, The reason why one is called a a Charlie class and the 
other is called an Echo-II may be due to a mix-up of the number 
of the submarine; 431 consists of the same digits as 314. 
However, according to Annex IV, K431 is a Echo-II submarine, 
while K314 is a Victor-I submarine. K313 is a Charlie-I sub- 
marine. 
According to the first source the accident was caused by an 
infringement of technical regulations which resulted in a break 
in the primary cooling system of the reactor plant. A valve which 
should have closed when the pressure of the system dropped, 
failed to do so. The fuel was exposed and melted. The cooling 
water that escaped, passed below the "biological zone"(shield?) 
and into the bilge below the reactor. Even though the accident 
was due to a construction defect, the crew did not do enough to 
isolate the accident. The whole crew was irradiated, but no crew 
members died due to the radiation exposure and no radioactivity 
escaped the submarine. 
Comments: The accident was clearly a loss-of-coolant 
accident. Whether it was an Echo-II or a Charlie class submarine 
is difficult to say. The correct number points towards the Echo- 
II class submarine and so does the facit that there are reports of 
submarines of the Echo class with damaged cores at the Pacific 
Fleet while there are no such reports on a Charlie class 
submarines. The more detailed account of the second accident 
points towards the Charlie class submarine. 
1985. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine Accident 
According to western sources a.n Echo-II class submarine 
suffers a reactor accident in 1985. As a consequence of the 
accident the submarine was retired. 
Comments: The accident is obvi.ously a reactor accident. 
However the information on the accident is limited and consisting 
with the preceeding accident. Since there are 3 submarines with 
damaged cores at the Pacific Fleet (cf. section 5) the accident 
is probably identical to Dec. 1985 Soviet Echo-II Class submarine 
(K431) Accident. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
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Jan. 1986. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine Incident 
On January 13th, 1986, a Japanese maritime patrol plane 
located a Soviet Echo-II class cruise-missile nuclear submarine 
under tow by a Soviet salvage ship 450 km north west of Okinawa 
in the East China Sea. The ships were heading towards the north. 
The submarine had obviously suffereci a failure of its propulsion 
system. The cause of the accident and the number of possible 
casualities are unknown. 
Comments: The reactor system may have been involved in the 
propulsion failure. 
Oct. 1986. Soviet Yankee Class Submarine (IC2191 Accident 
On October 3rd, 1986, a Yankee class ballistic-missile sub- 
marine of the Northern Fleet, K219, suffered an explosion in the 
No. 13 missile launching tube while sailing submerged about 800 
km east of Bermuda. The explosion was followed by a fire which 
ignited the liquid fuel of the SS-N-6 missile. The explosion 
caused damage to the hull. Four crew members were according to 
Russian sources killed by the accident. Others were wounded. The 
crew fought the fire with the submarine at the surface. On 
October 5th the fire was under control. The boat was towed by a 
Soviet merchant ship, but on October 6th, the crew was transfered 
to the merchant ship and the submarhe was abandoned, sinking at 
a depth close to 5000 m 1400 km south-east of New York or 1000 km 
north-east of Bermuda. The submarine was armed with 16 SS-N-6 
misiles, each containing one or two nuclear warheads. In addition 
it m a y  have been armed with 2 nuclear torpedoes. 
A more detailed Russian accourit of the accident has later 
become available. Early in the morriing of Oct. 3rd, 1986, when 
the Yankee-class ballistic missile submarine K219 was changing 
depth, water started invading the third missile launching tube on 
the port side. The water crushed the missile wall and caused an 
explosion in the 4th compartment, and the cover of the launching 
tube was torn off. The liquid rocket fuel burned and developed 
poisonous gases , while the water continued to invade the 
compartment. The submarine surfaced, and the second reactor was 
started. The fire was localized and the fire fighting started. 
However, the combustion of the rocket fuel produced very 
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poisonous gases which spread as an orange fog to other compart- 
ments through pipelines damaged by the fire. Some crew members 
suffered suffocation and all personel in the 4th compartment was 
ordered to leave it. Hereby the crew was divided into two parts, 
one in the forward and one in the aft part of the submarine. 
After 15 hours of fire fighting the water caused a short- 
circuit which apparently prevented Lhe full shut-down of the 
starboard reactor. The Control rods were not fully inserted. 
Attempts were made to send personel into the reactor room to 
insert the Control rods manually. The first attempts were 
unsuccessful due to the high concentration of poisonous gas and 
high temperature. Finally two crew members succeded in inserting 
the rods. During the operation one o€ them had to leave due to 
suffocation, but the other inserted the last rod. When he tried 
to get out of the reactor compartment, he could not open the door 
because in the meantime the air pressure on the outside had 
increased. Several attempts were made to get him out, but without 
success. 
Finally the Captain ordered the crew of the 8th compartment 
next to the reactor compartment to leave it. At the same time the 
submarine started for unknown reasons to sink. The crew was 
transfered to the Soviet ships next to the submarine. On October 
6th at 11.03 K219 disappeared in the waves and sank to a depth of 
5-6 km. The total number of crew memhers killed were 4. 
Comments: The accident did not directly involve the nuclear 
power plant, but of course one of the nuclear armed missiles. The 
problems experienced with the insertion of the Control rods of 
the starboard reactor are of course relevant for the nuclear 
propulsion plant. However, the consequence of the submarine 
sinking without full insertion of the Control rods does not seem 
very clear. As long as the reactor is shut down, it should not 
matter that the Control rods are not fully inserted. The reason 
for the manual insertion of the Control rods could possibly be to 
ensure that if the submarine sank and tilted over, the Control 
rods could fa11 out of the core and rnake the reactor critical. 
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Apr. 1989. Soviet Mike Class Submarine (K278) Accident 
On April 7th, 1989, at 11.03 the Mike class nuclear 
submarine of the Northern Fleet, K278, suffered an internal fire 
in the Norwegian Sea on its way back to its base at the Kola 
peninsula (Zapadnaya Litsa?) after a patrol at low depth (160m). 
The name of the submarine is ltKomsomoletslt. At that time the sub- 
marine was running submerged, 180-1130 km south-west of the Bear 
Island in the Norwegian Sea and 490 km from the Norwegian coast. 
The fire started in the 7th compartment. However one source 
says it started in the 6th, the aft engine room which contained 
reduction gear and/or diesel engines. The submarine had a total 
of 7 compartments. 
The reason for the fire seems uncertain. A liquid had been 
seen leaking from a hydraulic system, and this may have been the 
cause of the fire. Another source says that the fire was caused 
by a short circuit. Subsequent investigations indicated that a 
series of shortcomings and flaws was the reason for the fire. 
The fire alarm was activated. 'rhere was one crew member in 
the 7th compartment. He was called cver the intercom system, but 
did not answer. It was then decicled to send freon into the 
compartment. This should have extinguished the fire, but an 
electric arc cut a hole in a compressed air pipeline, and the 
resulting injection of air revived the fire. A few seconds later 
a beam of fire burned through to the 6th compartment where the 
crew members hardly had time to put on their gas masks. 
The crew stopped the starboard generator and the port 
generator stopped by itself. The automatic Control system shut 
the reactor down, possibly due to loss of power. Thus the 
submarine was without propulsion power which made it more 
difficult to reach the surface. The fire spread to the 5th 
compartment, and the cooling pump ir. the 4th compartment started 
to leak and could break down any minute. Shortly after the 
vertical rudder got stuck and the telephone connection between 
the compartments failed. It was not possible to inject freon into 
the 5th and 6th compartments since czew members were fighting the 
fire in these compartments. 
The Control rods were fully inserted into the reactor core 
to ensure that the reactor would stay subcritical. The submarine 
49 
rose slowly in the water and at 11.14 it surfaced. Kere K278 
tried to get in radio contact with the base. Only at 12.25 was 
the receipt of the SOS-signal confirmed. Real connection with the 
base was established at 13.27. A smal1 fire started in the 
command center (in the 3rd compartment?); it was rapidly 
extinguished, but the center was filled with smoke. The personel 
started to use breathing masks which were connected to the 
compressed air system. However, the high pressure in the 7th 
compartment had injected CO, into this system, so the personel in 
the command center soon had to remove the breathing masks. 
An attempt was made to rescue crew members in the damaged 
part of the submarine. A rescue team first entered the 4th 
compartment (reactor compartment?) and arranged for its ventila- 
tion. Next the team moved on to the 5th compartment, where they 
found a number of severely burned crew member . They were taken up 
to the deck, where an emergency hospital had been organized. The 
team also tried to enter the 6th compartment, but that was 
impossible due to smoke and fire. 
Around 2 o’clock a Soviet plane arrived over the area and 
helped to maintain radio communication. 
At 16.24 the hul1 vibrated di;e to internal explosions, 
probably originating in the tanks of the regeneration systemthat 
was used to remove CO, from the air in the submarine. As a result 
water started to flow into the submarine. K278 started to tilt 
and it was impossible to stand on the deck, so crew members 
jumped into the water. The Captain ordered the crew to abandon 
the ship. The rescue rafts were with some difficulty released, 
but only one of the two main rafts inflated. Rubber rafts were 
dropped from a plane, but they did not inflate. At 17.06 
Komsomolets sank at a position of ‘73°43’1611N, 13°15’5211E, 300 
nautical miles from the Norwegian coast and at a depth of 1680 m. 
The submarine went into a muddy grouiid to a depth of 2 to 3 m. 
At the time of sinking 6 crew members, including the 
Captain, were still inside the submarine. 5 of them succeded in 
reaching the rescue chamber, but it did not release from the 
submarine, before it reached a depth of 600 m. At this point the 
submarine suffered an explosion, and the chamber was released and 
moved upwards. The 5 men tried to put on their respiration gear, 
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but only two succeded. When the chamber reached the surface, the 
top lid opened, and the two survivors were thrown out in the 
water, while the others went down with the chamber which sank 
rapidly. One of the survivors drowned in the 2°C cold water. 
At 18.20 a supply ship rescuetl 30 survivors, but of these 
3 died before they reached Severomorsk. Of the 69 crew members a 
total of 4 died due to the fire and 38 drowned. 
The use of the compartments that were affected by the fire 
is not quite clear. One source states that the 3rd compartment 
contained the command center and possibly the reactor Control 
room. The 4th compartment contained the reactor, just behind the 
sail, and the 5th the pumps of the primary circuit. The 6th 
compartment may have contained the tzwo turbo-generators. 
The Komsomolets became operational in 1983 with the Northern 
fleet, and was thus a rather new submarine. Only one submarine 
has been built of this class, in the west called the Mike class. 
One western source has claimed that :Lt was provided with a liquid 
metal cooled reactor, another that: it was provided with two 
reactors. However from official Soviet and Russian sources it is 
known that Komsomolets was provided with ane pressurized water 
reactor with llmodestlyll enriched uranium as fuel. 
If the enrichment of the fuel was 5 to lo%, the fuel 
elements might have consisted of U0,-rods, contained in zirconium 
(or possibly stainless steel) claddhg tubes. If the enrichment 
was higher, say 20 to 40%,  the fuel material might have been a 
zirkonium-uranium alloy. It has beeii estimated that the reactor 
fuel at the time of the accident contained 42-76 kCi 90Sr and 55- 
83 kCi I3'Cs. This corresponds to an energy production of the 
order of 20 O00 MWth. The core also contained 2 kg Pu. To increase 
their lifetime the fuel elements contain burnable poison rods as 
an integral part. 
At the time of sinking the reactor had been cooled down to 
40 "C. The remaining decay heat production could be transfered to 
the sea by natura1 circulation. For this reason there was no risk 
of core melt-down. Before the Komsomolets sank, the Control rods 
were locked in the core by use of a special mechanism to prevent 
random displacement . Corrosion of th:is mechanism could af fect the 
reactor criticality only in the case of capsizing and only after 
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1995. Such capsizing could only occur if an attempt was made to 
raise the submarine. 
The reactor tank is made of steel of special quality and the 
inner surface of the tank is covered by a corrosion resistant 
layer, presumably stainless steel. In fig. 1 the arrangement of 
pressure vessel, steam generator, pressurizer and the main cir- 
culation pumps is shown. On fig. 1 is a l s o  shown the points where 
it according to Russian information is believed that the high 
outside pressure at the sea bottom is likely to have ruptured the 
primary circuit. In fig. 2 is indicated probable leakage routes 
for radionuclides of the primary circuit. 
The submarine was provided with a double hull of a titanium 
alloy. The thickness of the inner, pressure hull is about 10 cm, 
and that of the outer hull about 1 cm. The use of a titatium hull 
made it possible for the K278 to dive down to a depth of 1000 m. 
This depth was reach by Komsomolets on. August 5th, 1983. No other 
large submarine has ever reached such a depth. 
While titanium is very corrosion resistant in seawater, its 
electrochemical potential is rather di.fferent from that of steel. 
This means that electrolytic corrosim will take place between 
the titanium of the hull and the steel of the reactor system and 
other steel parts in the submarine. Consequently special 
techniques has to be used for joining the titanium hull to e.g. 
steel components. However, the rate of corrosion is influenced 
by a number of factors. For corrosiori to occur oxygen has to be 
present in the water; if the flow rate of the water is low, the 
available oxygen willbe consumed and the corrosion reduced. Only 
free titanium surfaces will give rise to electrolytic corrosion 
and parts of the titanium surface may be covered by paint. If the 
fuel rods are clad in zirconium rather than steel, the corrosion- 
rate will be affected. The corrosion rate is strongly dependent 
on the actual titanium, steel and zirconium alloys used. This 
makes it difficult to predict the corrosion rate. It has been 
mentioned that it is not unrealistic to believe that the first 
pinholes in the fuel cladding will develop in 5 to 10 years. 
The corrosion rate of the burnab:Le poison rods may be larger 
than that of the fuel rods.  This could lead to re-criticality. 
However, should this occur, it is un:likely thet it will lead to 
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Fig.1. The primary circuit of the Komsomolets nuclear power plant 
with indication of where the high overpressure at the sea bottom 
is likely to have ruptured the circuit. 
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Fig.2. Probable leakage routes for radio-nuclides of the primary 
circuit of the Komsomolets submarine. 
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a reactor excursion since corrosion will lead to gradual and 
very slow removal of the burnable poism, i.e. very slow increase 
of the reactivity. Only if a fast, large increase in the reac- 
tivity should occur will an excursion be physically possible, and 
such a reactivity increase is rather unlikely. Corrosion of the 
burnable poison would in all probability lead to a steady state 
operation of the reactor at low power due to its negative 
temperature coefficient. If an attempt was made to salvage the 
submarine, a mishap during such an operation might lead to 
removal of major amounts of absorber materials from the the 
reactor core. In such a case an excursion might be possible. 
Russian experiments and calculations have shown that long term 
corrosion of the core will not result in the formation of a new 
critical configuration. 
A western source claims that two additional crew members 
died later under rather strange circumstances. They felt fine 
after a medical examination at the naval hospital in Murmansk, 
but died suddenly after having smoked one cigarette each. If 
true, their death can hardly be due to radiation sickness as 
claimed by the media. As a matter of fact radiation did not play 
any role during the accident. 
On April 8th a 400 m by 100 m o i l  slick was all that could 
be seen at the ocean surface at the scene of the accident. 
Shortly after the accident the submarine was located by deep- 
water submersibles of the Soviet Naq, and the pressure hull of 
the boat was inspected. No visible damage was detected around the 
reactor compartment. The fact that cr-ew hatches, air vent pipes 
and some other systems were open when the submarine sank, ensured 
a pressure equalization between the iriside and the outside of the 
boat. 
During the first examination of Komsomolets in May 1989 it 
was found that it rested practically without any heal or trim at 
the sea bottom. 
During the second examination in 1991 it was found that the 
hull had sunk into the mud at the sea bottom at least 2.5 m at 
the bow and up to 4.5 m at the stern, both depth measured 
relative to the baseline of the submarine. It also revealed that 
the upper part of compartment 1 was damaged. There was a large 
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hole (20 m2) in the inner pressure hull above the torpedoes in 
the compartment 1. Measurements of the 137Cs concentration of the 
seawater around the submarine showed concentrations less than 0.4 
B q / l ,  much less than the maximum permissible concentration for 
drinking water. 
The third examination in May 1992 indicated further damage 
to the pressure hull in the bow end of the submarine. Along the 
port side at the bulkhead between compartment 1 and 2 a trans- 
verse crack, about 2 m long and up to 5 cm wide, was found. Along 
the same port side of the pressure hiil1 a long longitudinal crack 
had appeared, about 3 cm wide along its entire length. It ran 
from the big hole in compartment 1 to the front of compartment 3 
beneath the sail or possibly further. In some areas the crack had 
an opening reaching 40 cm. In the iipper part of compartment 2 ,  
along the port side and near the attachment of the emergency 
flotation buoy the hull damage conlprised a crack at least 3 m 
long and up to 30 cm ( ? )  wide. The niaximum concentration of I3'Cs 
was found to be 0.18 Bq/l. The rescue chamber was discovered 300 
m from the submarine. 
The Komsomolets had several roles to play. It was a 
laboratory to investigate the world below the sea surface. It was 
a prototype of an ocean-going underwater ferry intended for high 
velocity transport of freight and passengers. And it was an 
attack submarine which should deal with western ballistic missile 
nuclear submarines. It was according to western sources armed 
with SS-N-21 cruise missiles and heavy-weight type torpedoes. 
Both of these weapon types may be nuclear armed. According to 
information from Russian authorities Komsomolets contained 2 
missile torpedoes with nuclear warheads which contain 7 kg 239Pua 
Comments: The accident was caused by a fire which did not 
originate in the reactor compartment, and the reactor was shut 
down in an orderly way. When the reactor sank, the primary 
circuit had been cooled down to 40°C, and the remaining decay 
heat can undoubtedly be removed by natura1 circulation. After the 
submarine had reached the sea bottom, the pipes of the primary 
system ruptured due to the high outside pressure, but very little 
radioactivity has escaped. The description of the later death of 
two crew menbers sounds strange and may not be correct. 
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June 1989. Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine (K192) Accident 
At 04.30 (Moscow time) on June 26 ( 2 5 ) ,  1989, a leak 
developed in one of the components of the primary circuit of one 
of the two reactors of an Echo-II class cruise missile submarine, 
K192, of the Northern Fleet on transit fromthe Mediterranean Sea 
to Severomorsk. At that time the suklmarine was located 350 km 
south of the Bear Island or 110 kni north-west of Sørøya in 
northern Norway. The reactor was shut down, the submarine 
surfaced and the auxiliary diesel system started. By use of this 
system and towing the submarine sailed towards its home base in 
Severomorsk with a speed of about 5 knots. Smoke and/or steam 
rose from the submarine. The Soviet authorities stated that it 
was only smoke from the diesel plant while the Norwegian 
authorities was of the opinion that there was also steam, 
possibly coming from the leak in the reactor system. 
The leak in the primary circuit was of such magnitude that 
the water supply in the submarine did not suffice to compensate 
for the leakage. For this reason ships were sent out to the 
submarine to supplement its fresh water supplies. The water 
leaking out of the primary system was not dumped overboard, but 
collected in a special tank. According to later Russian infor- 
mation part of the fuel melted. 
Due to the shut-down of the reactors of the submarine the 
electric power production was substantially reduced. For this 
reason the air-condition system had to be switched off. This 
caused the temperature in the submar:ine to rise to 25 to 30 "C, 
and the crew was allowed on the deck to get fresh air. 
The temperature of the react;or coolant continued to 
decrease. In the morning of June 26th, it was 150 "C, in the 
evening 120 " C .  On June 27th it had dropped to 108 " C .  
According to one western source the crew tried to close the 
leak which was located in a pipe of the cooling system on June 
26. Therefore the water supply from the water supply ship was 
disconnected. It is claimed that a crew member forgot to reopen 
the water supply line before he went to dinner. An alarm 
indicated a temperature rise in the reactor and the water supply 
line was opened again. This source a:Lso claims that the heavily 
contaminated water of the reactor compartment was pumped over to 
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one of the escorting ships. However, the treatment plant of this 
ship broke down. After that cooling water was taken directly from 
the sea and pumped back into the sea again. After the return to 
the Ara Bay base facility the activity of the contaminated water 
was estimated to be 0.3 Ci/l totalling 2000 Curie. The crew 
recieved radiation doses up to 4 Rem. 
The submarine was visited by experts, including health 
physicists, on June 27th. They took water and air samples and 
found that the radiation situation was normal. According to 
Soviet statements there was no overexposure of the personnel and 
no risk of contamination. According to later Russian information 
all crew members were exposed to overdoses. Sea water and air 
samples were taken both by Soviet and Norwegian ships. The first 
Norwegian samples indicated no release of radioactivity from the 
submarine. Later there were indications of a smal1 leakage since 
13'1 and radio-lanthanides were detected. One sample of water 
contained 0.02 Bq 1311/kg. 
The submarine arrived at its home base on the Kola Peninsula 
on June 28th. The radiation level was found to be normal. 
Nevertheless 4 crew members were hospitalised for observation for 
radiation sickness. No sign of such sickness was found. 
Later Norwegianmeasurements of air samples seem to indicate 
that 13'1 was also released to the atmosphere, presumably con- 
tained in steam. The release could have taken place early during 
the accident to reduce the pressure in the reactor compartment. 
Norwegian authorities have interpreted the presence of 13'1 as 
indicating that a loss-of -coolant-accident and a partial core 
melt-down may have occured. 
The submarine is now located at the navy No. 10 - Shkval. 
Compressed air is pumped into the hul1 to maintain buoyancy. The 
damaged fuel can not be removed by ordinary procedures. 
Comments: There can be little aoubt that the accident was a 
loss-of-coolant accident which caused damage to the reactor core. 
The leak in the primary system must have been fairly large since 
new supplies of fresh water had to be delivered to the submarine. 
The very slow cooling-down of the primary system as compared e.g. 
to the Komsomolets accident (cfr. Apr. 1989) seems to indicate 
increased flow resistance through the core and thus reduced 
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cooling. This increased friction is undoubtedly due to fuel 
damage or partial core melt-down. 
The release of steam from the submarine, on which there is 
conflicting statements, could be done to avoid a too high 
pressure in the reactor compartment at the early phases of the 
accident. At this time the steam is not very radioactive since 
the fuel damage is still quite limited. A somewhat similar system 
exists in the early USSR-designed 'iTVER-230 power plants. It 
should also be noticed that the desti.llation process has a high 
decontamination factor so that only a small part of the radioac- 
tive nuclides released from the damaged fuel will be carried away 
with the steam. This could be the reason why only very low 
concentrations of 13'1 were measured. 
July 1989. Soviet Alfa Class Submarine Incident/Accident 
On July 17, 1989, the Norwegian authorities announced that 
fire had broken out in an Alfa-class submarine in the Barent Sea, 
120 km east of Vardø in northern Norway. Initially the Soviet 
authorities announced that the smok:e was part of a military 
exercise. However, later it was stated that while the submarine 
was submerged during a naval exercise the Control system 
indicated a fault in the reactor system. The reactor was shut 
down and the submarine surfaced. Here the diesel engine was 
started, and it was the smoke from this engine that looked as a 
fire. The alarm of the Control system is believed to be an error. 
The submarine returned to its base o11 the Kola Peninsula. 
A western source claims that the accident was due to a leak 
in a steam pipe. This source also states that the Illevel of 
radiation did not change for the worse". 
Water samples, taken by the Norwegian authorities in the 
area, contained small amounts of 13'1, presumably originating from 
the submarine. 
Comments: The second Soviet statement sounds reasonable 
though it is always a bit worrying when an explaination is 
changed. If the western source is correct, there may well have 
been an accident. Since no figures are available on the I3'I 
content of the sea water samples .it is difficult to assess 
whether it is an indecation of an accident or not. The fact that 
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the submarine sailed back to base without any assistance could be 
taken as an indication that the event was an incident. 
Dec. 1989. Soviet Delta IV Class Submarine Accident 
According to western sources Control of a missile was lost 
during a test launch from a Delta--IV class submarine in Dec. 
1989, and the missile fuel was dumped to prevent a more serious 
accident. 
Comments: The accident seems to have involved a missile 
failure rather than a submarine accident. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Jan. 1990. Soviet Admiral Ushakov Class Cruiser Incident- 
/Accident 
According to reports of unknown origin the Soviet nuclear 
powered cruiser Admiral Ushakov (ex Kirov) had problems with one 
of its two reactors in January 1990 when the ship was cruising in 
the Mediterranean. The event seems to have involved a smal1 
leakage in the primary circuit. The cruiser returned to its base 
on the Kola Peninsula on its own power. According to a western 
source the cruiser remained inactive since the event. 
Comments: If the event is real, it would seem reasonable to 
characterize it as an incident since the cruiser could return to 
base without external assistance. On the other hand, the cruiser 
has remained inactive since its return so the event may have been 
an accident. It obviously involved the propulsion system. 
Sep. 1991. Soviet Typhoon Class Submarine Incident 
According to a Russian source a Typhoon class nuclear 
submarine performed missile firing tests in the White Sea in the 
autumn of 1991. A missile was ejected from the launching tube, 
but apparently the rocket engine failed to ignite, and the 
missile fe11 back close to the submarine. The incident claimed no 
victims 
According to a western source ;in incident happened on Sep- 
tember 27th, 1991, during a missile test launch by a Typhoon sub- 
marine. The missile was fired in spite of orders to cancel the 
test. It is likely to be the same test as mentioned above. 
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Comments: The accident did not involve the submarine 
directly, but was a missile failure. The SS-N-20 missiles carried 
by Typhoon submarines each have 10 riuclear warheads, but they 
have without any doubt been removed before the test firing. 
Therefore this event will be neglected. 
Mar. 1994. French Emeraude Nuclear Submarine Accident 
On March 30th, 1994, the sea-water cooling system of one of 
the two steam condensers of the French nuclear attack submarine 
Emeraude failed. This failure resultetl in a pressure build-up in 
the condenser which ultimately exploded. The explosion sent steam 
and debris into the turbine-generator compartment and killed 10 
persons, including the Captain. The zrew brought the submarine 
back to port in Toulon by use of its d.iesel engine and batteries. 
Comments: The accident involved the propulsion system of 
the submarine, but not its reactor system. 
5. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIE'I' ACCIDENTS OF THIS REPORT 
AND THE DUMPED AND THE DAMAGED REACTOB 
In ref. 6 sea disposal of a number of Soviet submarine 
reactor compartments, submarine reactors and a nuclear submarine 
most of which had been involved in accidents, is reported. In 
this section a comparison will be made between the Soviet 
submarine accidents discussed in this report and the data of sea- 
disposed reactors given in ref. 6 to see whether the events can 
be correlated. 
In 1965 the Northern Fleet dumped 3 reactor compartments i n  
the Abrosimov Inlet on the eastern side of Novaya Zemlya. All 
contained two reactors. In one case (nuclear submarine fa.no. 
901) both reactors contained fuel, in another case (nuclear 
submarine fa.no. 285) only one of the reactors contained fuel and 
in the last case (nuclear submarine fa.no. 254) none of the 
reactors contained fuel. According to available information 
submarine fa.no. 901 is the Hotel class submarine K19 which 
suffered a loss-of-coolant accident in one of its reactors in 
1961 (cf. July 1961. Soviet Hotel Class Submarine (K19) Acci- 
dent) . The reason why the fuel was not removed from the undamaged 
reactor could be that the submarine was so contaminated that it 
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would be very difficult to get the fLel out. Submarine fa.no. 285 
is believed to be the November class submarine K11 which suffered 
a criticaiity accident in one of it:; reactors in 1965 (cf. Feb. 
1965. Soviet November Class Submarine (K11) Accident) . Finally 
submarine fa.no. 254 is believed to be the November class 
submarine K3. The reason for dumping its reactor compartment was 
not because it had been involved in an accident. However, it was 
the first Soviet submarine, and early operation had shown a 
number of weaknesses in the design. To overcome these weaknesses 
the reactor compartment was replacetl by a new and better one. 
In 1966 the reactor compartment from submarine fa.no. 260 
with two reactors without fuel was dumped in the Abrosimov Inlet. 
The compartment is believed to originate from November class 
submarine K5, the second Soviet nuclear submarine. Like in the 
case of K3 the replacement was not due to an accident, but to the 
need for better reactors. 
In 1967 the three reactors from the NS Lenin icebreaker was 
dumped in the Tsivolka Inlet at No-vaya Zemlya together with a 
container with the damaged core from the loss-of-coolant accident 
which one of the NS Lenin reactors siiffered in the autumn of 1966 
(cf. Autumn 1966. Icebreaker NS Lenfin Accident) . 
In 1972 a reactor with fuel from submarine fa.no. 421 was 
dumped in the Novaya Zemlya Depression. This submarine is 
believed to be identical to the Yankee class submarine K140 which 
suffered a criticality accident in 1968 (cf. Aug. 1968. Soviet 
Yankee Class Submarine (K140) Accident) . 
The Pacific Fleet sank 2 reactors without fuel in the Sea of 
Japan in 1978. This disposal could possibly be related to an 
accident (e.g. Mar. 1976. Soviet Ni;clear Submarine Accident) , 
but could equally well - since there was no fuel in the reactors 
- originate from planned replacement of reactors in one or two 
nuclear submarines. 
In 1981 the Northern Fleet dumped an entire submarine fa.no. 
601, which is identical to K27. This submarine which was provided 
with two liquid metal reactors, suffered loss-of-coolant accident 
in 1968 (cf. May 1968. Soviet Nuclear Submarine (K27) Accident) e 
It was sunk in the Stepovoy Inlet w:ith fuel in both reactors. 
Two reactors without fuel from submarine fa.no. 538 was 
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disposed of by the Northern Fleet in 1.988 in the Techeniye Inlet 
on the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. This submarine is believed 
to be identical to the submarine K222 :involved in the criticality 
accident in 1980 (cf. Sep. 1980. Soviet Nuclear Submarine (K222) 
Accident) . 
In 1989 the Pacific Fleet disposed of a core plate with 
thermal shield, but without fuel from submarine fa.no. 714 east 
of Kamchatka. This disposal could possibly be related to the Dec. 
1978. Soviet Delta-I Class Submarine (K171) Accident, but equally 
well to a planned replacement of the reactor insert or basket in 
one of the submarines of the Pacific Fleet. 
It should be noted that both the Northern Fleet and Pacific 
Fleet have submarines with damaged cores which are awaiting 
disposal. According available information the Northern Fleet has 
two submarines with damaged cores and the Pacific Fleet has 3 .  A 
western source claims that the Pacific Fleet has 4 submarines 
with damaged cores, but there is 1itt:Le evidence to substantiate 
this claim, so it will be disregarded. 
The two submarines with damaged cores at the Northern Fleet 
are believed to be the Echo-II class submarine K192 which 
suffered a loss-of-coolant accident in 1989 (cf. June 1989. 
Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine (K192) Accident) and the Alfa 
class submarine K377 which in 1972 lost its cooling when the 
liquid metal coolant solidified (cf. 1972. Soviet Alfa Class Sub- 
marine (K377) Accident). 
Western sources claim that K192 rests moored at the naval 
shipyard Shkval in Polyarny, and that air is pumped into the hul1 
to keep the submarine floating. 
As regards K377 the reactor compartment and the two adjacent 
compartments was cut out, sealed and prepared for sea disposal. 
However, according to western sources, before it could be done 
the Soviet Union ratified the London Convention which prohibits 
dumping of highly radioactive waste. Today it is stored floating 
at Severodvinsk, but western sources claim that there are plans 
to move it to Gremikha. 
The three submarines with damaged cores at the Pacific Fleet 
are believed to be the Echo-I class su.bmarine K116 which suffered 
a loss-of-coolant accident in 1979 (cf. July 1979. Soviet Echo-I 
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Class Submarine ( K 1 1 6 )  Accident), the Echo-II criticality 
accident in connection with refueling in 1985 (cf. Aug. 1985. 
Soviet Echo-II Submarine Accident) and the Echo-II class 
submarine, which suffered a loss-of-coolant accident in 1985 (cf. 
Dec. 1985. Soviet Echo-II/Charlie C:Lass Submarine Accident). 
6. ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 
In section 4 of this report 61. nuclear vessel events have 
been considered. Six events involve US vessels, one event a 
French vessel and 54 events Soviet/Kussian vessels. Even though 
there can be little doubt that the safety record is considerably 
better for nuclear vessels in the west that in the Soviet Union, 
the ratio of 7 to 54 may be misleading. The US Navy may simply 
have been better to avoid publicity of its events than has been 
the case in Russia. 
Of the 54 Soviet/Russian events, 19 can as discussed in 
section 4 be neglected because the information available is too 
meager, is incredible or covers events treated elsewhere. This 
leaves 35 events to be considered in more detail. 
Of these 11 were caused by fires/explosions, and in 3 of the 
11 cases the submarine was lost. This seems to indicate that 
Soviet submarines were not designed properly with respect to fire 
prevention or that the crews were not sufficiently well trained 
in this field or both. Similar criticism have been raised in ref. 
4 and 14. Insufficient fire protection of civilian nuclear power 
stations in the USSR have also beeri criticized. Fires at ships 
are always very dangerous, but they are particular dangerous in 
submerged submarines. The fires of the three lost submarines all 
started while they were submerged, but they managed to get to the 
surface and started to fight the fire, unfortunately not 
successfully. 
It is worthwhile noting that in none of the three cases 
where Soviet submarines were lost at sea, were the nuclear power 
plants involved. In addition to the three sunken submarines one 
sank due to mistakes by the crew, bi;t most of the crew was saved 
and the submarine was later recovered. 
As discussed in section 3 the use of nuclear power plant 
involve the risk of two types of accidents: Loss-of-coolant 
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accidents (LOCA) and criticality accidents. The Soviet/Russian 
nuclear Navy have experienced both tl=.ese types of accidents. 
Loss-of-coolant accidents play an important role in the 
accidents of Soviet submarines. There have been 6 LOCAs, three 
due to development of major leaks, one due to draining of the 
core after shut-down, one due to tlie shutting down the main 
circulation pumps by mistake and one due to blokage of fuel 
channels by metal oxides in a liquid-metal-cooled reactor. In 
addition to these 6 cases the liquid-rnetal-cooled reactors which 
use a coolant that melts at about 125"C,  have suffered 3 cases of 
coolant solidification due to too low temperature in the primary 
circuit. This type of accident may be called loss-of-cooling 
accidents. The severity of such solidification accidents vary 
very much. In one case the coolant coLld be remelted, in one case 
the repair of the submarine took 8 years and in one case the 
submarine was dismantled and the reactor compartment cut out for 
disposal. 
It is hardly surprising that of the 9 loss-of-coolant/- 
cooling accidents 4 occured in liquici metal cooled reactors and 
the remaining four in first generation submarines (Hotel and 
Echo) and in the first icebreaker Lsnin. Early Soviet nuclear 
power plant had emergency core cooling systems with limited 
capacity, and the same could be expected for the early nuclear 
naval reactors. Some sources claim Lhat they had no emergency 
cooling system at all. 
The Soviet navy has experiences 5 criticality accidents, all 
occuring when the reactor was shut down, and all due to human 
errors and lack of operating instrumentation. Two of the 
accidents occured during refueling, two in connection with work 
on the Control rod systems and one in connection with a hydraulic 
accidents are likely to occur when the reactor is shut down, not 
when it is operating at power. 
In two cases the accident is stated to be a reactor 
accident, but no details were given. It may have leaks in the 
primary circuits. These accidents are not believed to be very 
severe, since it is possible to accoimt for all dumped reactors 
and all reactors with damaged fuel without taking these two 
test of a reactor. It is interesting to note that criticality 
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accidents into account (cf. section 5 ) .  
There has been 6 cases of prop.Jlsion failures, but in most 
cases no details are given. One case involved a major leak in the 
steam generator system and one case a turbine run-away. Pro- 
pulsion failure may of course have involved the reactor system, 
but there is no indication that major damage has been caused to 
this system. As mentioned above it is possible to account for all 
dumped and damaged reactors without rakingthese 6 accidents into 
account. 
It is worth noting that in :;pite of the fact that the 
Soviet/Russian nuclear fleet has suffered a significant number of 
severe accidents with a substantial number casualties, little 
radioactivity seems to have been released to the environment in 
connection with the accidents. Even though Soviet designed 
reactors has not - until recently - been known for their 
effective containments, the Soviet reactor compartments or 
submarine hulls seems to act 
radioactive pollution point of 
connection with refueling are 
accidents since the reactor core 
during refueling. 
Summing up the distribution 
Fires : 11 
LOCAS : 9 
Criticality: 5 
Reactor accident: 2 
Propulsion failure: 6 
Other reasons: 2 
as good containments. From a 
view criticality accidents in 
pr-obably the most polluting 
must be open to the environment 
of the accidents is as follows: 
events 
events 
event s 
events 
events 
events 
TOTAL 35 events 
Of these about 20 were severe accidents, i.e. the lead to 
sinking of the vessel, replacement of the reactors, decommis- 
sioning or more than 5 death. 
The event listed in section 4 contain six events involving 
U.S. submarines of which one is neglected. Of these 3 events seem 
to involve leakage of seawater into the submarine, and in 1 of 
these cases the submarines were l o s t .  In one case a defect 
weapons system seems to be the most likely cause of the accident; 
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in this accident the submarine was lost. The fifth event is the 
only that involved the nuclear power plant; it was a smal1 leak 
in the primary circuit that could be repaired at sea without 
external assistance. 
Section 4 contain one accident with a French nuclear 
submarine, killing 10 persons. 
This means that of the 6 western events 3 were severe 
accidents. 
For ship reactors it is not possible to calculate the 
probability of accidents. The technicsl information on the design 
of these reactors needed to perfoim a probabilistic safety 
analysis (PSA) is not available to outsiders. However, due to the 
non-negligible number of accidents i.t is possible to estimate 
accident probabilities directly from accident data. 
The total number of ship reactor years (sry) up to 1994 of 
the nations with nuclear vessels has been estimated from 
available data. The number of reactor years is equal to the 
number of years the naval reactors of a given nation has been in 
operation. The following data was obtained: 
USA 3600 sry 
UK + France 500 sry 
West total 4100 sry 
USSR/Russia 7700 sry 
China 100 sry 
The World 12000 sry 
The high value of the USSR/Russian nuclear navy is due the 
fact that most of its submarines are provided with 2 reactors 
while other countries use one only and that it has built more 
nuclear vessels than all the other countries together. 
From the data given above the following accident pro- 
babilities (AP) may be obtained for all events, Pall, severe 
events, P,,,, and nuclear events, Pnuc: 
World AP, all events: Pworld,all = 41/12000 = 3 sry 
World AP, sev. events : Pwo,-ld,cev = 23/12000 = 2 sry 
World AP, nuc. event: Pworld,nuc = 16/12000 = 1 sry 
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USSR AP, all events: Pus,,, all = 35/7700 = 5 sry 
USSR AP, sev. events: Pus,,, sev = 20/7700 = 3 sry 
USSR AP, nuc. event: Pus,,, nuc = 16/7700 = 2 sry 
West AP, all events: P,,,,, all = 6/4100 = 1 sry 
West AP, sev. events: Pwest, sev = 3/4100 = 7 sry 
West AP, nuc. event: Pwest, = 0/4100 = O sry 
It is noted that while the western safety record is better 
than the Soviet/Russian, the diffference is not orders of 
magnitudes, but a factor 3 to 4. However, when it comes to 
nuclear events the west has so far had a unique safety record 
with no nuclear accidents. 
In the field of commercial nuclear power reactors the 
requirement is today that the accident probability for severe 
accidents must be below per reactor year. 
Nuclear ship accident probability should not be constant 
with time. With safer reactor plants, improved quality Control 
and - probably most important - improved safety culture and crew 
education there is room for improvements of the safety of nuclear 
vessels. Judging from the accidents of the Soviet/Russian Navy 
there are condiderable room for improvements of the safety 
culture at all levels in the Russian Navy. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In any forseeable future nuclear vessels will sail in the 
oceans. As long as this is the case the risk remains that 
accidents will happen. It is likely that the number of nuclear 
vessels will decrease in the future from the present 400 to say 
2 0 0 .  With an improved probability for severe accidents of 
this would mean that there will be a serious accident every 50 
year. It will be a considerable improvement as compared to today, 
but there will still be accidents. 
Both experience and theoretical investigations have shown 
that even though serious accidents with nuclear vessels have had 
and can in the future have very serious consequences for the 
crews involved, they have a quite mDdest impact on the environ- 
ment. Even in the case of refueling accidents where radioactivity 
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is released directly to the atmosphere the impact seems in 
practice to be limited to an area around the vessel with a radius 
which is of the order of 10 km. 
At several occations it has been claimed that accidents with 
nuclear vessels could have the same ar even larger magnitude as 
the Chernobyl accident. Such claims have no realistic basis for 
several reasons. Firstly, the power levels of naval reactors are 
about a factor of 30 lower than the Chernobyl reactor. This means 
that the amount of fissions products that could be released in an 
accident is about a factor of 30 lower. Secondly, the safety 
features of the pressurized water reactors (PWR) used in naval 
vessels are drastically different from the RBMK type of Cherno- 
byl. While PWR's are self -stabilizing, RBMK reactors are inherent 
unstable. Further the design of the Control rod system of the 
RBMK type revealed serious deficiencies during the accident; PWR 
reactors do not have similar features. Finally, the RBMK reactors 
contain large amounts of graphite which can burn and contribute 
to the release of radioactivity to the environment. PWR's contain 
no graphite. 
For these reasons any naval reactor accidents can not be 
nearly as severe as the Chernobyl accident. However, while severe 
accidents with submarine reactors crin not have the same long- 
distance consequences as the Chernobyl accident, they may still 
have severe consequence for people living close to the place 
where the accidents occur and they may in particular have grave 
consequences for the naval personnel involved. So the consequen- 
ces of naval reactor accidents shoulcl by no means be belittled. 
In this report available information on accidents with 
nuclear ships have been reviewed, and an attempt to evaluate the 
information has been made. As already mentioned the information 
presented may not be correct and consequently the analyses may 
not be correct either. The author of this report would appreciate 
very much to receive any additional information, corrections or 
criticism of the information and analyses so that any later, 
revised version of this report can be more correct. 
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Annex I 
Nomenclature Used for Soviet/Russian Nuclear Naval ShiDs 
The data in this annex have been obtained from ref. 5 and 
18. The data is not always consistent so the information should 
be used with caution. The first column gives the NATO designation 
of the vessel type. Initially the xrarious vessel types were in 
the Soviet Union designated by a project number, and when the 
types were modified, a letter was added; these letters are given 
in the equivalent western letters. The project numbers are given 
in the second column. Later the Riissians started also to use 
names for the various vessel types. These names are listed in the 
third column. In the fourth column the number of vessels given in 
ref. 5 are listed. This is presumably the number of vessels in 
operation when ref. 5 was published.. The last column gives the 
number of reactors per vessel. 
NATO 
name 
SUBMARINES: 
November 
November-ZhMt 
Hotel 
Echo-1 
Ec~o-2 
Victor-i 
Victor-2 
Victor- 3 
Yankee 
Yankee-Notch 
Charlie-1 
Charlie-2 
Papa 
Alfa 
Delta-1 
Delta-2 
Russian Russian Number No. of 
project name in op. 92? reactors 
number 
627,A KIT 5 
645 O 
658, M, U, 701 KS 1 
659,T 
675 , M, MKV 
671, R, V, K 
671 RT 
671 RTM 
667 A 
667 M 
667 AT 
670 A 
670 M 
661 
705,ZMT,K 
667 B 
667 BD 
3 
17 
YERSY? 15 
7 
S JCHUKA 25 
NAVAGA/NALIM 10 
ANDROMEDA 1 
GRUSHA 6 
SKAT 10 
SKAT M 6 
ANCHAR 1 
L I M  5 
MURENA 18 
MURENA -M 4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 (i?) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 (2?) 
1 
2 
71 
NATO 
name 
Delta-3 
Delta-4 
Oscar-1 
Oscar-2 
Typhoon 
Sierra-1 
Sierra-2 
Akula 
Mike 
Severodvinsk 
X-ray 
Uniform 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
Blekkom-5 
Russian Russian 
project name 
number 
Number 
in op. 92? 
667 BDR KALMAR 14 
667 BDRM DELFIN 7 
949 ANTEY (GRANIT?) 2 
949 A ANTEY 8 
941 AKULA 6 
945 2 
945 B MARS 3 
971 BARS, SHCHUKA-B8 
685 PLAVNIK O 
885 O 
678 1 
1910 (1851?) 1 ( 3 ? )  
10831 AS-12 o (l?) 
1143.7 
CRUISERS 
Balkom-1 (Kirov) 1144 
MISSILE TEST SHIP 
Kapusta 1941 
ORLAN 
TITAN 
1 
4 
1 
No. of 
reactors 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 (i?) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
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Annex II. 
Number of Nuclear Naval Vessels Built in USSR/Russia 
Type Bellona 
Total 
November 13 
November-ZhMT 1 
Hotel 8 
Echo- I 5 
Echo-II 29 
Victor-I 15 
Victor- I I 7 
Victor-III 26 
Yankee 34 
Charlie-I 11 
Charlie-II 6 
Alfa 7 
Papa 1 
Mike 1 
Sierra 6 
Akula 13 
Delta-I 18 
Delta-II 4 
Delta- I I I 14 
Delta- IV 7 
Typhoon 6 
Oscar 13 
Severodvinsk O 
X-ray 1 
Uniform 3 
Project 10831 1 
Kirov 4 
Blekkom-5 - 
Kapusta 1 
Bellona 
North 
10 
1 
6 
O 
11 
13 
7 
16 
24 
O 
6 
7 
5 
1 
3 
1 
2 
O 
Bel 1 ona 
Pac i ii i c 
3 
2 
5 
18 
2 
O 
10 
10 
11 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
7 
9 
O 
9 
O 
O 
4 
O 
O 
O 
O 
2 
1 
BMQ 
5 
1 
3 
17 
15 
7 
25 
10+7 
10 
6 
5 
1 
5 
8 
18 
4 
14 
7 
6 
10 
1 
1 
4 
O 
1 
This 
report 
13 
1 
10 
5 
29 
17 
7 
26 
34 
12 
6 
6 
1 
1 
4 
13 
18 
4 
14 
7 
6 
12 
1 
3 
4 
Total 255 162 93 1 9 1  255 
7 3  
The figures given in this annex aim at obtaining an estimate 
of the total number of naval vessels built by USSR/Russia. The 
first column gives the figures for total number of vessels built 
as presented in ref. 18. The figures of the next two columns are 
according to ref. 18 the distribution of the vessels built 
between the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. In this 
connection it should be remembered that a vessel has sometimes 
been transfered from one fleet to the other during its operatio- 
nal life, so the figures may contain a certain amount of ambi- 
guity. The fourth column gives the number of vessels in operation 
about 1992 as obtained from ref. 5. Finally the last column is a 
Danish estimate of the total number of vessels built, based on 
western naval handbooks and The Strategic Balance from IISS. 
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Annex 111 
USSR/Russian Naval Reactor Data 
The data presented in this report has been obtained from 
ref. 18. The data are not always consistent with data given 
elsewhere, so they should be used with caution. 
Vessel Class Reactor Data 
November 
NovemberZhMT 
Hotel 
EChO-I 
EChO-II 
Victor-I 
Victor - I I 
Victor-III 
Yankee 
Charlie-I 
Charlie-II 
Alfa 
Papa 
Mike 
Sierra 
Akula 
2 PWR model VM-A, 2*70 MWt (2*17500 hp), 
U-enrichment 21% 
2 LMR (Pb+Bi) model VT-1, 2*73 MWt (35000 hp) 
U-enrichment 90% 
As November class 
As November class 
As November class 
1 PWR model OK-300 with VM-4 core, 75 MWt 
(31000 hp (15500 hp?)) , U-enrichment 21% 
2 (l?) PWR model OK-300 with VM-4 core, 
2*75 MWt, U-enrichment 21% 
2 PWR model OK-300 with VM-4 core, 2*75 MWt, 
U - enr i c hmen t 2 1- % 
2 PWR model OK-700 with VM-4 core, 2*90 MWt 
(2*20000 hp), TJ-enrichment 21% 
1 PWR model OK-350 with VM-4 core, 89.2 MWt 
(18000 hp), U-enrichment 21% 
1 PWR model OK-350 with VM-4 core, 
(2*?) 75MWt (90 MWt?) , U-enr. 21% 
1 LMR (Pb+Bi) model OK-550/BM(MB?) -40A, 
155 MWt, U-enrichment 90% 
2 PWR model VM-5m, (2*?)177.4 MWt (80000 shp) 
1 PWR model OK-650b-3, 190 MWt (43000 shp) 
U-enrichment 23--45% 
1 PWR model OK-650, 190 MWt (47000 hp) 
U - e nr i c hmen t 2 3- - 4 5 % 
1 PWR model OK-650b, 190 MWt (43000 shp) 
U - enr i c hmen t 2 1- - 4 5 % 
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Delta-I 
Delta - I I 
Delta- I I I 
Delta-IV 
Typhoon 
Oscar-I 
Oscar-II 
Severodvinsk 
X-ray 
Uniform 
10831 
Admiral Ushakov 
Kapusta 
2 PWR model OK-700 with VM-4 core, 2*90 MWt, 
(2*20000 shp), U-enrichment 21% 
As Delta-I class 
2 PWR model OK-700 with VM-4-2 core, 2*90 MWt, 
(2*30000 shp (2* .20000 shp?)) , U-enr. 21% 
As Delta-III class 
2 PWR model OK-650 with W core, 2*190 MWt 
(2*50000 shp), U-enrichment 21-45% 
2 PWR model OK-650bI 2*190 MWt (2*50000 shp) 
U-enrichment 21-45% 
As Oscar-II class 
1 PWR model KPM, 200 MWt (43 O00 hp) 
1 PWR, 10 MWt 
1 PWR, 10 MWt (10000 SHP) 
1 PWR, (i0000 hp) 
2 PWR model KN-3, 2*300 MWt (140000 shp) 
2 PWR model KN-3 (OK-900) w. VM-16 core, 
2*171 MWt 
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Annex Ill 
The Russian Nuclear Naval Fleet 
The data contained in this annex is based on ref. 18 and 
ref. 5. The data do not always agree, so it should be used with 
caution. For example there is a number of cases where the same 
code, e.g. K-52 and K-114, is used for two different submarines. 
Each Soviet/Russian submarine is given a code consisting of one 
(sometimes two) letter and a number. The letter is usually K, but 
the Russian B has been used for the November and the Victor class 
according to ref. 5. The code of the individual submarines is 
listed in the first column. In the second column the NATO code 
name is given. In the third column t.he Russian type designation, 
the project number, is given. Next fiollows a letter, either N or 
P which indicates to which fleet the vessel belongs (N for 
Northern Fleet, P for Pacific Fleet) . In the fifth column the 
fabrication number is given; this riumber is sometines used for 
identification of a submarine instead of the code number. Finally 
it is indicated if the code has beeri changed. If the name of the 
submarine is known, it is given in the next line. 
K-1 Echo-II 
K-3 November 
Leninskiy 
K-5 November 
K-7 EChO-II 
K-8 November 
K-10 EChO-II 
K-11 November 
TK- 12 Typhoon 
TK-13 Typhoon 
K-14 November 
K-16 Hotel 
TK-17 Typhoon 
K-18 Delta-IV 
K-19 Hotel 
Submarines 
Pro]. 675, N, fa.no.535, 
Pro]. 627, N, fa.no.254, 
Pro]. 627, N, fa.no.260, 
Pro]. 675, PI , later K127 
Komsomol 
(K107?) 
Pro]. 627, N, fa.no.261, 
Pro]. 675, p, 
Pro]. 941, N, 
Proj. 941, N, 
Pro]. 627, N, fa.no.285, 
Pro]. 627, P, fa.no.262, 
Pro]. 658, N, fa.no.905, 
Proj. 941, NI 
P r o ] .  677BDRM, N I  
Pro]. 658, N, fa.no.901, 
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TK-20 Typhoon Proj. 941, 
K-21 November Proj. 627, 
K-22 EChO-II Pro]. 675, 
Krasnogvardeets 
K-23 Echo-II Pro]. 675, 
K-25 Charlie-I Proj. 670A, 
K-26 Yankee Proj. 677A, 
K-27 NovemberZhMT Pro]. 645, 
K-28 EChO-II Pro]. 675, 
K-31 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-32 Yankee Proj. 667A, 
K-33 Hotel Pro]. 658, 
K-34 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
Kef al 
K-35 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-38 Victor-I Proj. 671, 
K-40 Hotel Pro]. 658, 
K-42 November Pro]. 627, 
Rostovsky Komsomolets 
K-43 Charlie-I Proj. 670A, 
K-44 Delta-III Proj. 667BDR, 
K-45 EChO-I Proj. 659, 
K-47 EChO-II Pro]. 675, 
K-48 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-50 November Proj. 627, 
N I  
NI fa.no.284, 
NI fa.no.538, 
PI 
p, 
N, fa.no.422, 
NI 
N I  fa.no.536, later K-428 
p ,  , later K-431 
N, fa.no.423, 
N I  fa.no.902, 
PI , later K-134, 
N I  fa.no.539, 
, fa.no.600, 
N I  fa.no.904, 
p, 
p, 
N, fa.no.534, 
p ,  
NI fa.no.290, 
K-51 
K-52 
K-52 
K-53 
K-55 
K-56 
K-57 
K-59 
K-64 
K-66 
K-69 
K-71 
K- 74 
Delta-IV 
November 
Echo-II 
Victor-I 
Hotel 
Echo-II 
EChO-II 
EChO- I 
Delta-IV 
EChO-I 
Victor-I 
EChO-II 
EChO-II 
Proj. 667BDRM, N I  
Pro]. 627, N, fa.no.283, 
Proj. 675M, 
Proj. 671, , fa.no.603, 
Pro]. 658, P, fa.no.903, 
Pro]. 675, , later K-557 
Pro]. 675, p, 
Pro]. 659, P I  
Proj. 659, p, 
Proj. 667BDRM, N, 
Proj. 671, , fa.no.601, later K-369 
Proj. 675, NI fa.no.530, later K-166 
Pro]. 675, N I  fa.no.537, 
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K-84 
K-86 
K-87 
K-90 
K-92 
K-94 
K-104 
K-107 
K-108 
K-114 
K-114 
K-115 
K-116 
K-117 
K-119 
K-121 
K-122 
K-123 
K-125 
K-127 
K-128 
K-129 
K-132 
K-133 
K-133 
K-134 
K-135 
K-137 
K-138 
K-138 
K-140 
K-141 
K-144 
Delta-IV 
EChO-II 
Charlie-I 
EChO-II 
Delta- I I 
EChO-II 
EChO-II 
November 
EChO-II 
De 1 t a - IV 
Victor-III 
November 
Echo-II 
Delta-IV 
Occar-II 
Vorone 
Charlie-I 
EChO-I 
Alfa 
Echo-II 
Echo-II 
Echo-II 
Delta- III 
Oscar-II 
Belgorod 
November 
EChO-I 
EChO-II 
Kef al 
Echo-II 
Yankee 
Leninets 
Yankee 
Victor-III 
Yankee 
Oscar-II 
Kursk 
EChO-II 
Pro]. 667BDRM, N, 
Proj. 675, N, fa.no.532, 
Proj. 670A, , later K-212 
Pro]. 675, P, 
Proj. 675, P, 
Proj. 667BD, N, fa.no.352, 
Pro]. 675, , fa.no.531, later K-144 
Pro] o 627, , earlier K-7? 
Pro] e 675, P, 
Pro]. 667BDRM, N, 
Pro]. 671RTM, N, 
Pro] o 627, P, fa.no.265, 
Pro]. 675, p, 
Pro]. 949A, N, 
Proj. 667BDRM, N, 
Pro]. 670A, P, 
Pro]. 659, P, 
Proj. 705, N, fa.no.105, 
Proj. 675, N, fa.no.542, 
Proj. 675, P, , earlier K 
Pro]. 675, P, 
Pro]. 949A, P, 
Pro] o 667BDR, 
-7 
Pro]. 627, P, 
Pro]. 659T, 
Pro]. 675, P, , earlier K-34, 
Proj 675, P, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.420, 
Pro]. 667A, 
Pro]. 671RTM, N, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.421, 
Pro]. 949A, N, 
Proj. 675, N, fa.no.531, earlier 104 
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K-145 Hotel Proj. 658, 
K-147 Victor-I Proj. 671, 
K-148 Oscar-II Proj. 949A, 
Krasnodar 
K-149 Hotel Proj. 658, 
Ukrainsky Komsomolets 
K-157 Akula Proj. 791, 
Tigr 
K-159 November Proj. 627, 
K-162 Papa Proj. 661, 
K-166 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-171 Delta-I Proj. 667B, 
K-172 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-173 Oscar-II Proj. 949A, 
Chelyabinsk 
K-175 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-178 Hotel Proj. 658, 
K-180 Delta-III Proj. 667BDR, 
K-181 November Proj. 627, 
K-182 Delta-II Proj. 667BD, 
K-184 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-186 Oscar-II Proj. 949A, 
Omsk 
K-189 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-192 EChO-II Proj. 675, 
K-192? Yankee Proj. 667A, 
K-193 Delta-II Proj. 667BD, 
K-201 Charlie-I Proj. 670A, 
TK-202 Typhoon Proj. 941, 
K-203 EChO-II Proj. 675M, 
K-206 Oscar-I Proj. 949, 
Murmansk 
K-207 Yankee Proj. 667A, 
TK-208 Typhoon Proj. 941, 
K-209 Charlie-II Proj. 670M, 
K-210 Yankee Proj. 667A, 
K-211 Delta-III Proj. 667BDR, 
K-212 Charlie-I Proj. 670A, 
N I  fa.no.906, 
, fa.no.602, 
NI 
N, fa.no.907, 
N, 
N I  
N, fa.no.501, later K-222 
, fa.no.530, earlier K-71 
P, fa.no.340, 
n 
PI 
PI fa.no.908, 
NI fa.no.287, 
NI fa.no.351, 
PI 
NI 
PI 
NI fa.no.533, 
N I  fa.no.353, 
p ,  
NI 
N I  fa.no.400, 
NI 
N I  fa.no.911, 
N, fa.no.401, 
P I  , earlier K-87 
8 0  
K-214 Yankee 
K-216 Yankee 
K-218 Victor-III 
K-219 Yankee 
K-222 Papa 
K-223 Delta-III 
K-223 Victor-II 
K-229 Victor-III 
K-228 Yankee 
K-236 Yankee 
K-239 Sierra 
Carp 
K-241 Yankee 
K-242 Victor-III 
K-244 Victor-III 
K-245 Yankee 
K-247 Victor-III 
K-249 Yankee 
K-251 Victor-III 
K-252 Yankee 
K-253 Yankee 
K-254 Victor-III 
K-255 Victor-III 
K-258 Yankee 
K-259 EChO-I 
K-263 Akula 
K-264 Victor-III 
K-266 Oscar-II 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 661, 
Proj. 667BDR, 
Proj. 671RT 
Proj 671RTM, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 945, 
Proj. 667A, 
Pro] o 671RTM, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 671RTMl 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 671RTMl 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Proj. 671RTMl 
Proj. 667A, 
Proj. 659, 
Proj. 971, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Proj. 949A, 
Severodvinsk, later Orel 
K-267 Akula Proj. 971 
Drakon 
K-276 Sierra Proj. 945, 
K-278 Mike Proj. 685, 
Komsomolets 
K-279 Delta-I Proj. 667B, 
K-284 Akula Proj. 971, 
K-292 Victor-III Pro] 671RTM, 
K-298 Victor-III Proj. 671RTM, 
N I  fa.no.452, 
N I  fa.no.424, 
NI  
N I  fa.no.460, 
N, fa.no.501, earlier K-162 
N I  fa.no.470, 
PI 
N I  
N I  fa.no.462, 
PI 
NI 
N I  fa.no.450, 
PI 
N I  fa.no.402, 
PI 
PI 
N, fa.no.414, 
N I  
N, 
PI 
p, 
PI 
P I  
N I  
N, 
NI 
N I  fa.no.310, 
p, 
NI 
N, 
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K-299 Victor-III 
K-302 Charlie-I 
K-305 Victor-III 
K-306 Victor-I 
K-308 Charlie-I 
K-313 Charlie-I 
K-314 Victor-I 
K-316 Alfa 
K-317 Akula 
Pantera 
K-320 Charlie-I 
K-322 Akula 
K-323 Victor-I 
K-324 Victor-III 
K-325 Charlie-I 
K-327 Victor-III 
K-328 Akula 
Leopard 
K-331 Akula 
K-336 Delta-I 
K-336 Sierra 
Okun 
K-355 Victor-III 
K-358 Victor-III 
K-360 Victor-III 
K-366 Delta-I 
K-367 Victor-I 
K-368 Victor-I 
K-369 Victor-I 
K-370 Victor-I 
K-371 Victor-II 
K-373 Alfa 
K-377 Alfa 
K-380? Oscar 
K-385 Delta-I 
K-387 Victor-II 
K-388 Victor-III 
K-389 Yankee 
Pro]. 671RTM, 
Pro]. 670A, 
Pro]. 671RTM, 
Proj. 671, 
Pro]. 670A, 
Pro]. 670A, 
Pro]. 671, 
Pro]. 705, 
Proj. 971, 
Pro]. 670A, 
Pro]. 971, 
Pro]. 671, 
Pro]. 671RTM, 
Pro]. 670A, 
Pro]. 671RTM, 
Pro]. 791, 
Pro]. 791, 
Proj. 667B, 
Proj. 945, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Pro]. 671RTM, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
Pro]. 667B 
P r o j .  671, 
Pro]. 671R 
Pro]. 671, 
Proj. 671, 
Pro]. 671RT, 
Pro]. 705, 
Proj. 705, 
Proj. 949, 
Proj. 667B, 
Pro]. 671RT, 
Proj. 671RTM, 
N I  
PI 
PI 
, fa.no.604, 
PI 
PI 
, fa.no.610, 
N I  fa.no.905, 
NI 
PI 
PI 
, fa.no.605, 
N I  
p, 
NI  
N, 
Proj. 667A, PI 
PI 
NI  
PI 
PI 
, fa.no.609, 
, fa.no.601, earlier K-69 
, fa.no.606, 
N I  fa.no.802, 
N I  fa.no.910, 
N I  fa.no.900, earlier K-47? 
N I  fa.no.324, 
N I  fa.no.801, 
N I  
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K-391 Akula 
K-395 Yankee 
K-398 Victor-I 
K-399 Yankee 
K-403 Yankee 
convert ed 
K-407 Delta-IV 
K-408 Yankee 
K-410 Oscar-II 
Smolensk 
K-411 Yankee 
converted 
K-412 Victor-III 
K-415 Yankee 
K-417 Delta-I 
K-418 Yankee 
c onve r t ed 
K-419 Akula 
K-420 Yankee 
conver t ed 
K-422 Yankee 
convert ed 
K-421 Delta-II 
K-423 Yankee 
conver t ed 
K-424 Delta-III 
K-426 Yankee 
K-428 EChO-II 
K-429 Charlie-I 
K-430 Yankee 
K-431 EChO-II 
K-431 Victor-I 
K-432 Alfa 
K-433 Delta-III 
K-434 Yankee 
K-436 Yankee 
K-438 Victor-I 
K-441 Delta-III 
Pro]. 971, p, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.415, 
Pro]. 671, , fa.no.611, 
Proj. 667AT, N, fa.no.441, 
Pro]. 667A, p, 
to Yankee Notch 
Pro]. 667BDRM, N, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.416, 
Pro]. 949A, N, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.430, 
to carry 2 minisubs. 
Pro]. 671RTM, P, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.451, 
Pro]. 667B, p, 
Pro]. 667AT, N, fa. no. 431, 
to Yankee Notch 
Pro]. 971, p, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.432, 
to Andromeda 
Pro]. 667AT, 
to Yankee Notch 
Pro]. 667BD, N, fa.no.354, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no. 442, K-422? 
to Yankee Notch 
Pro]. 667BDR, 
Pro]. 667A, N, fa.no.440, 
Proj 675, N, fa.no.536, earlier K-28 
Pro]. 670A, p, 
Pro]. 667A, p ,  
Pro]. 675, p, , earlier K-31 
Proj. 671R, 
Pro]. 705, N, fa.no.106, 
Pro] o 667BDR, 
Pro]. 667A, p, 
Pro]. 667A, p, 
Pro]. 671, , fa.no.608, 
Pro]. 667BDR, 
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K-442 Oscar-II 
Tomsk 
K-444 Yankee 
K-446 Yankee 
K-447 Delta-I 
K-448 Victor-III 
K-449 Delta-III 
K-450 Delta-I 
K-451 Yankee 
K-452 Charlie-II 
Berkut 
K-454 Victor-I 
K-455 Delta-III 
K-456 Oscar-II 
Kasatka 
K-457 Delta-I 
K-458 Charlie-II 
K-460 Delta-I 
K-461 Akula 
Volk 
K-462 Victor-I 
K-463 Alfa 
K-465 Delta-I 
K-469 Victor-I 
K-472 Delta-I 
K-475 Delta-I 
K-476 Victor-II 
K-477 Delta-I 
K-479 Charlie-II 
K-480 Akula 
Bars 
K-481 Victor-I 
K-487 Delta-III 
K-487 Victor-II 
K-488 Victor-II 
K-490 Delta-BDR 
K-492 Victor-III 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
667A, N I  fa.no.461, 
667A, PI 
667B, N I  fa.no.311, 
671RTM, N I  
6 6 7BDR , 
667B, N I  fa.no.312, 
667A, PI 
670M, NI fa.no.901, 
671, , fa.no.612, 
6 6 7BDR , 
949A, PI 
667B, N I  fa.no.325, 
670M, N I  fa.no.902, 
667B, N I  fa.no.337, 
971, N I  
671, , fa.no.613, 
705, N I  fa.no.915, 
667B, N I  fa.no.326, K-456? 
614, , fa.no.614, 
667B, N, fa.no.338, 
667B, N I  
671RT, N I  fa.no.803, 
Proj. 667B, P I  
Proj. 971, NI 
Proj. 670M, N, fa.no.903, 
Proj. 671, , fa.no.615, 
Proj. 667BDR, 
Proj. 671RT, 
Proj. 671RT, N I  fa.no.804, 
Proj. 667BDR, 
Proj. 671RTM, P I  
K-493 
K-495 
K-496 
K-497 
K-500 
K-502 
K-503 
K-506 
K-507 
K-508 
K-512 
K-512 
K-513 
K-517 
K-523 
K-524 
K-525 
Alfa 
Victor- I I 
Delta- I I I 
Delta-I 
Delta-I 
Victor-III 
Charlie-II 
Delta- I I I 
Victor-III 
Charlie-II 
Delta-I 
Oscar 
Victor - I I 
Victor-II 
Delta-I 
Victor-III 
Oscar-I 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj 
Proj. 
Proj 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj e 
Proj o 
Proj. 
Proj. 
Proj. 
84 
705 , 
671RT, 
6 6 7BDR , 
667B, 
667B, 
6 7 1RTM , 
670M, 
6 6 7BDR , 
6 7 1RTM , 
670M, 
667B, 
949 , 
671RT, 
671Rt, 
667B, 
6 7 1RTM , 
949 , 
N I  fa.no.107, 
N I  fa.no.621, 
N I  fa.no.904, 
PI 
, fa.no.905, 
P, 
N I  fa.no.625, 
N I  fa.no.627, 
PI 
N I  
N, 
Minsky Komsomolets, later Arkhangelsk 
K-530 Delta-I Proj. 667B, PI 
K-530? Oscar Proj. 949, 
K-557 Echo-II Pro] 675, PI , earlier K-57 
K-? Sierra Proj. 945, N, 
K-? Sierra Proj. 945, NI  
K-? Akula Pro], 971, N, 
K-? Akula Pro]. 971, N, 
Barracudas 
Condor 
Vepr 
Gepard 
Mini Submarines 
AS-11 X-ray Pro]. 1851, N, 
AS-15 Uniform Proj. 1910, N, 
AS-16 Uniform Proj. 1910, N, 
AS-? Uniform Proj. 1910, N, 
AS-12 Pro]. 10831, N, 
8 5  
Cruisers 
Kirov (Orlan) Pro]. 1144, N I  
Kirov (Orlan) Proj. 1144, Nf 
Kirov (Orlan) Proj. 1144, PI 
Kirov (Orlan) Pro]. 1144, PI 
Admiral Ushakov, earlier Kirov 
Admiral Lasarev, earlier Frunze 
Admiral Nakhimov, earlier Kalinin 
Pyotr Veliky, earlier Yury And.ropov 
Communication Ship 
Kapusta (Titan) Proj. 1941, Pf 
Distribution of RAK-2.3 reports: 
DENMARK: 
Danish Nuclear Inspectorate 
attn: Louise Dahlerup 
Dan Kampmann 
Datavej 16 
DK-3460 Birkerød 
Denmark 
Ris0 National Laboratory 
attn: Erik NonhJal (6 co??es) 
S. E. Jensen 
B. Majborn 
P.O. Box 49 
DK-4000 Roskilde 
Denmark 
Kaare Ulbak 
SIS 
Frederikssundsvej 378 
DK-2700 Brønshøj 
Denmark 
Prof. Heikki Kalli (2 copies) 
Lappeenranta University of Tcchnology 
P.O. Box 20 
FIN-5385 1 Lappeenranta 
Finland 
VTT Energy 
attn: Ilona Lindholm (3 copies) 
Lasse Mattila 
Risto Sairanen 
Esko Pekkarinen 
P.O. Box 1604 
Finland 
FIN-O2044 VTT 
Hannu Ollikkala (2 copies) 
Finnish Centre of Radiation & 
Nuclear Safety (STUK) 
P.O. Box 14 
FIN-O088 1 Helsinki 
Finland 
Prof. Fbiner Salomaa 
Helsinki University of Technology 
Dcpartmcnt of Technical Physics 
Finland 
FIN-O2 150 Esp00 
Heikki Sjovall 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
FIN-27160 Olkiluoto 
Finland 
ICELAND: 
Tord Walderhaug 
Geislavarnir rikisins 
Laugavegur 1 18 D 
IS-150 Reykjavik 
Iceland 
NORWAY: 
Sverre Hornkjol 
Statens Strålevern 
P.O. Box 55 
N-1345 Osterås 
Nonvay 
Geir Meyer 
iFE/Halden 
P.O. Box 173 
N- 175 1 Halden 
Norway 
Per I Wethe 
IFEKjeller 
P.O. Box 40 
N-2007 Kjeller 
Nonvay 
SWEDEN: 
Kjell Andersson 
Karinta-Konsult 
Box 6048 
Sweden 
S-183 06 Taby 
Jean-Pierre Bento 
KSU AB 
Box 1039 
S-611 29 Nykobing 
Sweden 
Statens Karnkraftinspektion (SKI) 
attn: Wiktor Fried (3 copies) 
Oddbjorn Sandervåg 
Lennart Carlsson 
Christer Viktorsson 
S-10658 Stockholm 
Sweden 
Prof. Jan-Olof Liljenzin 
Chalmers Tekniska Hogskola 
S-41296 Goteborg 
Sweden 
Studsvik EcoSafe AB 
attn: Lars Nilsson (2 copies) 
Lennart Devell 
S-6 1 182 Nykobing 
Sweden 
Royal Institute of Technologj 
attn: Prof. Bal Raj Sehgal 
Prof. Jan Blomstrand 
Dr. Ingemar Tiren 
Brinellvagen 60 
S-10044 Stockholm 
Sweden 
Statens Strålsakerhetsinstitut (SSI) 
attn: 
S-17116 Stockholm 
Sweden 
Jan Olof Snihs (2 copies) 
Jack Valentin 
Yngve Waaranpera 
ABB Atom AB 
$72 163 Vesterås 
Swcden 
REFERENCE GROUP FOR THE RAK 
PROGRAMME: 
Bjorn Thorlaksen 
Danish Nuclear Inspectorate 
Datavej 16 
DK-3460 Birkerød 
Denmark 
Markku Friberg 
Industriens Kraft TVO 
FIN-27160 Olkiluoto 
Finland 
Gcrt Hedner 
Statens Karnkraftinspektion (SKI) 
S-10658 Stockholm 
Sweden 
Magnus Kjellander 
KSU AB 
Box 1039 
$61 1 29 Nykobing 
Sweden 
Petra Lundstrom 
IV0 International Oy 
Finland 
FIN-01019 IVI 
Gustav Lowenhielm 
FKA 
Forsmarks Krdtgrupp Al3 
$742 03 Osthammar 
Sweden 
Lasse Reiman 
Finnish Centre of Radiation & 
Nuclear Safety (STUK) 
P.O. Box 14 
FIN-0088 1 Helsinki 
Finland 
Egil Stokke 
IFE/Halden 
P.O. Box 173 
N-1751 Halden 
Nonvay 
Jan-Anders Svensson 
Barseback Kraft AB 
Box 524 
S-246 25 Loddekopinge 
Sweden 
Bjorn Wahlstrom 
VTT Automation 
P.O. Box 13002 
Finland 
FIN-02044 VTT 
Povl L. Ølgaard (3 copies) 
Ris0 National Laboratory 
P.O. Box 49 
DK-4000 Roskilde 
Denmark 
EXECUTWE SECRETARY: 
Torkel Bennerstcdt 
NKS 
PL 2336 
S-760 10 Bergshamra 
Sweden 
